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The objective of this paper is to assess and analyse 
the characteristics of the present marine casualty 
investigations procedure / system < under the Kenya 
Merchant Shipping Act ) which is employed in Kenya for the 
purpose of ascertaining the causes and / or probable 
causes of marine casualties.
This assessment is an attempt aimed at defining and 
recommending the best possible methods of improving 
impartiality < particularly within the formal inquiries 
procedure ) and the effectiveness of the general casualty 
investigations system in the country.
It is further the intention of this paper to 
objectively demonstrate how complete casualty reports, 
comprehensive investigations and the subsequent 
operational follow up of recommendations, monitoring and 
dissemination of information, could effectively contribute 
to marine safety promotion in Kenya. In addition this 
could prevent future occurrence of casualties and the 
prevalent costly and tim^ consuming inquiries. This is 
because the right targets and interests will be provided 
with the opportunity to learn the extent and nature of the 
conditions that downgrades safety, thereby making 
suggestions for the correction of any wrong procedures 
uncovered. Mariners would as well learn from the 
experience of others and become alerted to the problems.
These are goals perceived as geared towards assisting 
the Maritime Safety Administration in Kenya in enhancing 
its efforts to ensure continuous safety of life and 
property at sea.
Particular attention will be given in chapter five to 
the desirability for Kenya to develop a system that:
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- Will meet the needs and nature of the maritime 
community by retaining the best features of the
.present system, while making modifications where 
necessary at reasonable costs,
- Will be consistent with IMO conventions and 
resolutions, giving particular emphasis to the 
necessary ratification of the important instruments 
relating to safety.
In order to facilitate necessary analysis, conclusions 
and achievement of the above objectives, the following 
topics will be taken into account and examined in chapters 
1, 2, 3, and 4, in that order of priority;
- The present functions and responsibilities of the 
Maritime Administration in Kenya with a view to 
analysing the need for some structural changes, 
particularly within the Maritime Safety 
Administration, which is the regulatory body 
entrusted with the ^jowers to conduct casualty 
investigations. ( ch.l )
- The existing marine casualty investigations 
legislation, practices and procedures in Kenya.
( ch.2 )
- The most commonly acceptable safety promoting 
casualty investigation studies. ( ch. 3 )
- A comparative examination of other countries' 
legislation and practices < ch.4 )
CHAPTER 1
1.1 INTRODUCTION.
Kenya, a product of the European scramble for African 
colonies in the 19th century, attained her independence 
from British rule in 1963.
Geographically Kenya is situated on the Eastern Coast 
of Africa and has a total area of 582,646 square 
Kilometers. About 13,393 square kilometers of this area is 
water covered, mainly by Lake Turkana and part of Lake 
Victoria.,The country borders Ethiopia on the North East, 
Sudan on the North West, Somalia on the East, Tanzania on 
the South, the Indian Ocean on the South East, Uganda and 
Lake Victoria on the West. Kenya has a coastline which 
covers 200 miles, stretching from the border with Somalia 
in the North to the border with Tanzania on the South.
The official estimate of the population of■Kenya as of 
1990 was approximately 24 million people with a growth 
rate of about 3.6 % per annum.
Nairobi is the capital city as well as the 
Administrative Headquarters of Kenya and has a growing 
population estimated at 1.5 million people.<1>
1.1.1 HISTORICAL SHIPPING ACTIVITY - AN OVERVIEW.
Participation of Kenya in marine activities dates back 
to the pre - Islamic period in East Africa when Arab 
traders linked the Eastern Coast of Africa to the 
countries of the Far-East, India and the Arabian Gulf.
From here trading commodities were brought for exchange at 
the various ports along the coast. By the 12th and 13th
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centuries the old Mombasa town acted as a Dhow traffic 
port town, as vrell as Manda situated on the North coast of 
Kenya. Later in the 15th century Mombasa was the chief sea 
port of the coast.<2> Thus, intensified commercial 
activities were a common phenomenon along the East Coast 
of Africa though sometimes interrupted by changing trade 
patterns, trading commodities and the political situation 
of the time. During the 16th century, the Portuguese had 
established control of maritime trade on the Indian Ocean 
and viewing Mombasa as having a distinct advantage because 
of its deep sheltered habour, made the port their 
Headquarters.
This continued until the late 1660's v/hen the British 
dislodged the Portuguese and thus consequently, laid the 
foundation upon which the port of Mombasa is based today. 
The construction of the first jetty by the British took 
place in 1666, in Kilindini for the purpose of discharging 
arriving materials for the construction of the rail line 
through Kenya to Uganda.
Today, Mombasa port is the chief seaport of Kenya, 
handling the country's export and import trade as well as 
trade for Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Northern Tanzania and 
Southern Sudan. Other ports serving coastal trade and
f
undergoing development are Finji, Kilifi, Kiunga, Lamu, 
Malindi, Mtwapa, Shimoni and Vanga. Kisumu is a lake port 
serving transport needs on Lake Victoria and the 
surrounding regions.
The increasing growth of population in Kenya and that 
of neighboring landlocked countries, coupled with the 
recent economic development realized since independence, 
has resulted in an increase in shipping activities in 
Kenya. The various functions of the port have, therefore, 
developed in response to these demands and the reliance of 
Kenya and these other countries on overseas trade.
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Mombasa port began its development into a modern port 
from the 1920's when the first deep water berth was 
completed in Kilindini. This was followed by nine more in 
the 1950's. The 1960's saw the construction of an oil 
jetty among other facilities at Kipevu for accommodation 
of oil tankers.
Demand for more berthing accommodation necessitated the 
construction of berths 11- 14 during this same period.
The amount of traffic passing through Mombasa port reached 
5 million tons in 1969 from 3 million tons since 
independence. This traffic averaged about 6.5 million tons 
in the 1980's with a peak throughput of 8.4 million tons 
in 1981 following the completion of berth numbers 16 and
17 in 1975 for container handling.
As a consequence of this construction, container traffic 
handled through the port continued to grow, reaching over 
129,666 TEU'S in 1989 from 92,461 TEU'S in 1984. This was 
the time when an inland container deport at Embakasi, 
Nairobi had become operational and a container berth no.
18 had been completed three years earlier at the port.(3)
The above figures are-of special relevance to this
paper as they are an indication of the large number of 
ships of various types and sizes engaged in sea transport 
and visiting the port of Mombasa. Although Kenya has no 
ships engaged in overseas trade, the responsibility of 
safety and seaworthiness of all the foreign flag ships 
calling at Mombasa is that of the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications, presently delegated to the Merchant 
Shipping Office in Mombasa.
Besides cargo vessels, the port also handles passenger 
ferry services operating through Likoni, providing a 
transport link between the island and the mainland across 
the Kilindini channel. Millions of passengers, among them
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thousands of tourists, and vehicles cross the channel 
every year. Cruise vessels also operate between Mombasa, 
Mogadishu, Lamu, Zanzibar, Dar -es -Salaam, Seychelles, 
Commoro Islands and other tourist sites in the region. 
Their number is expected to increase to cater to the 
growing number of tourists.
The early 1990's, saw the launching of the Kenya 
National shipping line which has been viewed as a turning 
point for the country's shipping industry. Kenya's 
shipping has been dominated by foreign interests since the 
collapse of the East African shipping line thirteen years 
ago. This line had represented the three Eastern African 
countries in international shipping and influenced their 
early involvement in IMO activities.
Following the collapse of the East African Shipping 
Line, Kenya's participation in international shipping 
activities was greatly reduced. The development of the 
Kenya National Shipping Line is therefore expected to 
enhance the present position in shipping through 
transportation of national cargo, provision of services to 
shippers in Kenya and the neighbouring landlocked
countries. It will also provide employment for Kenyan
rmariners.
This may also influence the long overdue national 
obligation for the ratification and subsequent 
implementation of those IMO conventions that have not been 
recognised by Kenya. It could be of great significance in 
the promotion and development of marine safety in Kenya, 
For example, ratification of SOLAS 1974 / 78 and the 1988 
protocol could enable creation of upto date statutory 
rules and regulations to ensure safety onboard Kenyan and 
foreign ships. Presently, Kenyan registered vessels 
practically continue to operate outside the purview of
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this convention because the Merchant Shipping Act has not 
provided for application of the provisions of SOLAS 1960 
to which Kenya is a signatory. Unless Kenya becomes party 
to the convention, it may not exercise the type of control 
provided in the convention. In fact, the surveys and 
certificates which could be issued to foreign ships would 
even earn the country some foreign currency. On the other 
hand, acceptance of the STOW 1978 Convention would show 
that Kenya recognises the need to maintain high training 
and certification standards for seafarers necessary for 
safe operation of ships. Ratification of the same would 
also form the basis for Kenyan domestic training and 
issuance of certificates of competency acceptable 
internationally. It will further make it easier for Kenyan 
mariners to secure employment on foreign ships.
Generally, because of its obligation as a flag state, 
recognition of international conventions will benefit the 
country in gaining international recognition in the 
maritime field. It v^ill also enable the country to have 
easier access to .technical assistance and cooperation from 
IMO and other states.
Last but not least, marine operations in Lake Victoria
f-
have also been active. Vessels of varying sizes, 
technology and types have plied the lake serving trade 
demands along the coast and within the vicinity of the 
lake for years. There has been an increase in the number 
of passenger and cargo services to Southern Nyanza ports 
such as Homa Bay, Kendu Bay and Kisumu, meeting both 
population and economic growth demands. Transportation in 
the lake operates at minimal costs and this has made it a 
preferable choice for overcoming the long distances that 
by any other mode of transport would be very expensive.
Train wagon ferries betv/een Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania
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have been serving trade demands in the region and are 
expected to increase due particularly to the current 
peaceful political situation in Uganda.
Many more fishing boats and canoes, fisheries, research 
boats, police patrol boats, and privately owned passenger 
and pleasure boats also operate in various waters along 
the coast and on Lake Victoria. Their sheer numbers, the 
pronounced unseaworthiness, age and the poor manning 
quality of these vessels have all raised concern for the 
Maritime Administration and the government.
1.1.2 MARITIME SAFETY - AN OVERVIEW.
The marine activities described above have not gone on 
v/ithout incidents or accidents. There have been casualties 
within the territorial waters of the country which have 
involved Kenyan registered, also unregistered commercial 
vessels, and foreign flag vessels. To note a few of the 
most current cases: " the tug Harrier disappeared while on
her voyage to Zanzibar in 1988 v/ith loss of all on board 
< a commission of inquiry v/as set up to conduct the 
casualty ),(4) an oil storage and .supply barge the Alpha K 
sunk in February, 1990,(5) the F.V Ujuzi grounded in May, 
1990,(6) and the motor tanker Bernora grounded in July, 
1990 while bound for Formosa fishing grounds with loss of 
10 lives *' (7). Although these are only four casualties, I 
find the frequency of occurrence particularly of the last 
three, to be very short and indeed very revealing in 
respect to marine safety in the country. This is most 
apparent when one takes into account the small size of the 
Kenyan registered fleet.( Annex 2 ).
In Kenya, as elsewhere in the world, sea transport is 
known to involve high risks. The tremendous technological
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changes that have taken place in ship designs, manning 
levels and limits on nationality of crew, have been 
changing along with management systems for vessels and 
cargoes, making some of the risks even more complex. Also 
the uncertain and inhospitable sea conditions in which 
vessels must operate, the increasing overreliance on 
technical developments and continually aging fleet are 
oust three of the many factors which cause concern for old 
and new types of hazards and which can lead to an increase 
in casualties.
To elaborate on the ship age factor and its relation to 
casualties, studies by Prof. J. W Doerffer in 1990 
indicated that the age of a vessel has been a 
disadvantageous factor. According to his report to IMO, 
the lowest casualty rate in the world fleet is in the 
group of new ships up to the age of 10 years. This rate 
rises sharply for the vessels in the age group of 10 to 14 
years, and attains its highest level for the group 15 to 
19 years old. The casualty rates for ships above 20 years 
old is nearly 60 % higher than for ships below 14 years.
He goes on to say that " the older the ship, the more they 
are apt to sustain damage, especially if they are not 
adequately manned ".(8)
Annex 2 has a lot of relevance here as it reflects a 
clear picture of the age of these vessels. The minimum age 
being 10 years and the maximum age 39 years, indicating 
thus the requirement for high standards of maintenance.
And expected increase in casualties in the future.
The extent and importance of marine activity in Kenya, 
coupled with the appreciation of the seriousness of the 
safety problem is highlighted here in an attempt to focus 
attention in this document on the need for a viable 
casualty investigations system. Difficulties hov/ever, 
encountered in obtaining access to any compiled marine
7
casualty data has precluded a statistical evaluation of 
the scope of the problem which Kenya faces.
1.2 THE PRESENT MARITIME LEGISLATION.
The Kenya Merchant Shipping Act of 1967 was modelled on 
the British Merchant Shipping Act of 1894. This was 
adopted during the inception of the now defunct Eastern 
African National Shipping Line, which was a joint venture 
between Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia. Although time 
has passed and marine activities have increased in Kenya, 
no changes have been made to this act. Comparatively many 
changes have already been effected by the British to 
update this maritime legislation. Kenya has since this 
time ratified a few IMO conventions, but none of them have 
been incorporated into the Kenya Merchant Shipping Act. 
Another deficiency of this legislation is that it does not 
apply to the regulation of inland water transport.
Since the Kenya Merchant Shipping Act originally came 
into force on December 1, 1967, it has only been amended
by a few legal notices. It is comprised of 10 parts which 
cover 317 sections. Very briefly, the individual parts 
deal with:
Part 1 ( Preliminary ) - interpretation.
Part 11 - Registration and licensing of ships
and covers transfers, mortgages, name of ship, 
nationality and flag etc as well as 
measurement of ships and tonnages.










apprentices, ranging from their certification 
to their contracts of employment, wages, 
provisions, health and accommodation, 
protection and discipline. It also covers 
relief and repatriation of distressed seamen.
Passenger ships.
Safety in all its ramifications i.e 
surveys, load lines, certificates, distress, 
prevention of collisions, loading of cargo, 
and seaworthiness.
Wrecks - the receivers of wreck,
removal of wreck, salvage and investigations
into casualties.
Limitation of liability and division 
of liability in the event of a collision.
- Legal proceedings such as offenses, 
jurisdiction, foreign ships, inquiry into 
cause of death on board a ship, detention of 
ships and limitation of actions in civil 
proceedings.
Pollution.
( is supplemental ) and deals with such matters 
as exemptions of government ships, general 
powers of the minister, delegation of powers 
and the powers to make regulations.(9)
purpose of this paper, the primary focus is on
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part VI (b> , -which deals with investigations into shipping 
casualties under the Sub - Title " Shipping casualties and 
accidents on ships " . (Annex 3 is a typed copy of part VI 
<b)
Despite the lack of amendments to the Act, it is still 
applicable to the country's requirements dealing with 
maritime matters. Hovrever, Kenya should unde,rtake to 
update it by incorporating those conventions that have 
been ratified as well as the provisions of a number of 
other conventions which have not yet been ratified. These 
conventions have a great significance on the country's 
participation and contribution to international shipping 
trade, its promotion of marine safety and its protection 
of the marine environment. International conventions 
provide for a significant source of international law and 
as such, the required basis for the establishment of 
national legislation governing maritime activities.
Certain international obligations e.g SOLAS chapter 1 
( reg. 21 ) place on member parties the requirement to 
investigate casualties occurring to any of its ships
subject to the provisions of the convention ....
Under the ILO - Minimum Standards Convention 1976, each i
member state should undertake to hold an official inquiry
rinto any serious casualty involving ships registered in 
its territory, particularly those involving injury and or 
loss of life. The final report of such an inquiry is also 
required to be made public etc.
In order for any flag state to effectively fulfill 
these obligations, first it must be a party to the 
conventions, otherwise it may have difficulties in 
establishing the necessary regulations and rules to assist 
MARAD in performing its safety promoting functions.
In addition to the conventions recommended under 1.1.1, 
i.e SOLAS and STCW 1978. Kenya should consider MAE^OL 1973
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/ 78 as well. Considering that Mombasa port has the 
capability of berthing ships of all sizes and types, 
including large tankers, there is need for provisions for 
prevention and control of marine pollution in the country. 
If a major spill was to take place today in the coastal^ j 
waters, the only option for MARAD would be to seek 
assistance from foreign countries and the time lag may 
prove disastrous to the marine environment and to the \ 
nation at large.
Provisions in MARPOL would further make it easy for ^ 
violations to be dealt with. Reporting of spills and other 
marine environment violations would also be effected. They 
would provide for the right to arrest and detain ships 
which violate the requirements laid down in the 
convention. The surveys and issuance of certificates 
provided in the convention could even earn the country 
foreign exchange. Because Kenya has no fleet of tankers 
and considering the financial burden of this convention, 
MARPOL 78 could be considered first to meet the above 
urgent needs.
Since the country lacks adequate requirements to 
regulate fishing vessels safety and considering the safety 
deficiency posed by th^se vessels in Kenya, the 
international convention for the safety of fishing vessels 
1977, needs to be accepted. The Kenya Fisheries Act only 
regulates net size and other fishing related activities.^
The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions 
at sea, COLREG 1972, has relevance here for provision of 
collision regulations and guidelines in the country.
Kenya has been very keen in promoting tourism in an 
attempt to diversify the economy and attract foreign 
exchange. Mombasa harbour today is providing berthing 
facilities to cruise ships. The government, in view of 
recognising cruise ships and passenger interests should
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recognise the Athens convention on carriage of passengers 
and their luggage.
Other instruments of major importance are the 
stipulated resolutions ( annex 4 >. They provide 
recommendations necessary for casualty investigations 
jurisdiction guidelines, casualty information, casualty 
cooperation requirements etc.
The above are a few of the many conventions that cannot 
be ignored because of their relevance to marine safety 
promotion, and are useful inter alia for the development 
of maritime national legislation.
1.3 THE PRESENT FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF MARAD.
Unlike many traditional maritime nations and some ~ 
developing countries, Kenya does not have a clearly 
defined and well structured maritime administration. 
However, the Maritime Administration <MARAD) in Kenya is 
placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications which has delegated authority 
to its Department of Civil Aviation. MARAD forms a 
division within this department.
1.4 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND
COMMUNICATIONS.
The Ministry is in charge of maritime policy, e.g, 
shipping policy involving shipping regulations, economic 
regulations, environmental regulations, operational 
regulations, and jurisdictional regulations amongst
12
others. In those areas which fall under its jurisdiction, 
it coordinates and handles all matters pertaining to IMO 
and other international agencies, e.g, UNCTAD and ILO, in 
so far as they concern maritime activities in Kenya.
The remaining maritime administrative functions have 
been delegated by the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications to the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA).
The KPA therefore administers the Merchant Shipping Act 
with respect to those functions falling under its 
jurisdiction and pursuant to the Kenya Ports Authority Act 
of 1977. However, the safety maritime administration 
functions and duties are delegated to the Merchant 
shipping Superintendent. The Merchant Shipping 
Superintendent is appointed by the Minister for Transport 
and Communications but he remains an employee of KPA, thus 
designated to carry out Safety Administration functions 
stipulated in the Merchant Shipping Act.
Under section 313 of the above Act, it is provided 
that :
"For the better execution of certain provisions of 
this Act the Minister may delegate his powers except 
the powers to make rules and regulations and pov^ers
conferred by sections .....of this Act, to an
officer in this Act referred to as the Merchant 
Shipping Superintendent and any thing done by such 
officer in respect of this Act in consequence of 
such a delegation shall be deemed to have been done 
by the Minister".
The above matters are however, delegated to these 
authorities after they have been ratified and adopted by 
the Government.
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1.5 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE KENYA PORTS AUTHORITY.
The KPA, was established by the Kenya Ports Authority 
Act of 1977, becoming law in 1978. This replaced the 
corporation status adopted by the Eastern African 
community which ceased on 31st Dec. 1977. The objective of 
the Act was to facilitate and achieve development and 
management of the ports along the coast of Kenya amongst 
others. This Authority is managed by an executive managing 
Director and a Board of Directors.
Its responsibilities include:
- Carrying out of all shipping activities of the 
industry with the major aim of developing the ports 
consistent with modern port economies.
- Providing facilities for cargo handling and 
v/arehousing in the ports.
- Installing and maintaining navigational aids, etc 
along the coastal v/aters of the country.
- Ensuring that all ports are operated efficiently, 
economically and safely and maintain the best 
possible standards.
- It undertakes the training of junior mariners in 
Bandari College in Mombasa which fails under its 
management.
KPA is therefore the government's agency for the 
execution of maritime administrative responsibilities 
pertaining to commercial shipping and port operations in
14
the country.( KPA Act. 1977 )
1.6 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MERCHANT SHIPPING OFFICE.
The Merchant Shipping Office is the office having 
the role of the maritime safety administration in Kenya.
It is within KPA's organization and has its total 
operating costs under the financing of KPA. As mentioned 
before, it administers the Merchant Shipping Act and those 
other duties delegated by the Minister for Transport and 
Communications. It is the office managed by the Merchant 
Shipping superintendent, an employee of KPA appointed by 
the minister. This presents a dual role which is 
difficult to play since the Merchant Shipping office has 
to seek for approval of its decisions from the KPA 
management. Official expenditure on ship inspections for 
example, travel by casualty investigators when casualties 
occur, or to Nairobi ( Ministry of Transport and 
Communications Head office ) for consultations, 
involvement in international affairs ( attending IMO 
meetings ), inter-alia, must receive KPA approval. These 
problems experienced by this office cause unnecessary 
delays in execution of the various functions entrusted to 
the office.
The MSS's present functions are :
- The Merchant Shipping Acts enforcement / safety
regulations.
- Registration of ships.
15
- Survey, inspections and certification of ships.
- Tonnage measurement of unregistered vessels.
- Matters pertaining to crev;, e.g, examination and 
certification of Masters, Mates and Engineers and 
placement of Kenyan crew onboard foreign ships.
- Registration of seamen.
- Detention of untrustworthy ships.
- Survey and licensing of unregistered vessels.
- Accidents and shipping casualty investigations.
- Marine pollution control work.
— Advisory role to the Government on IMO safety 
conventions and maritime affairs.
- Implementation of the UNCTAD liner code of conduct 
for liner conferences.(10>
The Merchant Shipping Superintendent's office should 
be granted independent powers, autonomy and an independent 
budget among other authorities. These are significant 
contributory factors to the enhancement of office 
efficiency and improvement of marine safety. They can 
facilitate vessel inspections, surveys and certification, 
reduce casualty investigation processes, enable easy 
movement of surveyors to casualty sites for example, 
facilitate gathering of information, and provide for 
procurement of office equipment such as computers.
The MSS's office has been charged with functions aimed
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at furtherance of marine safety, among them the 
investigations into marine casualties ( the major focus of 
this paper). Therefore, casualty investigations conducted 
by the Merchant Shipping office should be aimed at 
achieving this objective in all respects. The above 
recommendations are meant to contribute substantially 
towards this direction, but how can effective casualty 
investigations contribute to marine safety ?
- Casualties should show whether there are lessons to 
be learned. In order to get to this, the investigator may 
need to find the causes of the casualty.
- Casualty investigations assist in keeping up 
professional standards, because omissions or safety faults 
identified are rectified. Those found responsible are 
punished v^hen it is necessary in order to prevent them 
from repeating similar mistakes in future.
- To answer questions such as what happened ? hov; did 
it happen why did it happen ? and v/hat can be done to 
prevent it happening again ?, a surveyor requires a lot of 
information on a casualty. In addition, he may undertake 
investigation reviev/s and the subsequent follow up actions 
on safety deficiencies and the recommendations made.
Since some casualty reports do not explain everything 
that an investigator needs to know, more information must 
then be sought. In such cases, and depending on the 
particular site of the casualty, travelling to the 
casualty site is found necessary for gathering the 
required information. This information could be from the 
shipowner, from the master or perhaps for a fuller report 
on the accident as a v/hole or on specific points to be 
made by an investigator.
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Although the office of the MSS is based in Mombasa, no 
professional staff have been deployed to other areas along 
the coast to coordinate or undertake an investigation of 
casualties that may occur here. The only course of action 
taken under such circumstances is sending an investigator 
to the area, thereby involving urgent decisions to be made 
because time becomes crucial.
Sometimes investigations require formal examination of 
witnesses who may be considered helpful in assisting in 
the determination of the cause of the casualty. Such 
interviews may require more than one investigator because 
of the urgency of the statements and also in order to 
avoid alteration of information, interference with 
witnesses and / or reduction of information quality due to 
delays.
Casualty investigation reviews and follow up are 
important, since v/eaknesses in operational practices are 
pointed out where they have been seen. Hov/ these could be 
improved is another question which is also answered. This 
enables identified inadequate procedures to be followed 
and corrected by the authorities.
Casualty records are important for statistical summary 
and for annual publishing. They could be used to show 
casualty short term trends in the country and also in long 
term studies of either particular factors of casualties or 
for research for studies like this one.
At the moment, casualty recording is not of any 
required standards and a lot of effort is required in this 
area. Computer systems would offer great assistance to 
this office if made available.
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1.7 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE KENYA RAILWAYS CORPORATION.
The Kenya Railways Corporation is a government 
parastatai body which has the jurisdiction and 
responsibility to operate marine services plying in the 
portion of Lake Victoria which borders the Kenyan 
mainland. The lake has a surface area of 62,940 square 
kilometers and is situated within the borders of South 
West Kenya, Northern Tanzania and Eastern Uganda.
Among the services provided are the obligatory welfare 
passenger ferry operations entrusted by the government to 
the Corporation. Wagon ferry is one of these servises. It 
is an expansion of the rail operation aimed at providing 
cheap and reasonable transport to cargo shippers. Other 
crafts performing supporting functions such as tov/ing, 
repair, maintenance of piers and harbour waters, and 
dredgers are also operated. Maintenance of these vessels, 
their manning, the training of officers and crev/, 
investigations into casualties occuring in the lake are 
responsibilities of the KR.
Also fishing vessels, mostly uninspected fishing boats
tand canoes, operate in the lake, the majority of them 
without official authority, licenses and or life saving 
equipment. Thus, they engage in risky transportation of 
passengers, with occasional and sensational marine 
incidents involving heavy loss of life.
This situation has been difficult to control and 
concern has been raised on several occasions to the 
authorities to enforce strict regulations to improve 
operational safety.
Although these vessels are not strictly sea - going 
vessels, the question of ensuring safety of life and 
property on the lake should remain very relevant.
Since the collapse of the East African Community and
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the subsequent invalidation of the East Africa Inland 
Water Transport Act, lake operations have remained under 
the Kenya Railways Act. Because marine safety depends very 
much on competence of officers and crew, the standard of 
periodical surveys and inspection of vessels as well as 
availability of repair facilities. The authorities should 
embark on :
- Improved training of mariners, for 
efficient examination / inspections 
vessels and for comprehensive inves 
casualties.
- Strict enforcement of regulations.
- Strict regular vessel inspections / surveys etc.
- Improved procedures and guidelines for casualty 
reporting and investigations into casualties
with the assistance of the Merchant Shipping office.
- Total banning of the operation of unseaworthy vessels 
( when deemed necessary ) through withdrawal of 
operating licences, detention of vessels etc.
- Improved and modernized maintenance and repair 
facilities in Kisumu.
The KR management in charge of the present arrangement 
in respect of training, examination, inspections, surveys 
and casualty investigations should involve the technically 
qualiffied marine personnel in the Ministry of Transport 
and Communucations, the Merchant Shipping 'Office and 
Bandari college. The proper cooperation and coordination
safe manning, 
and survey of 
tigations into
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of the above activities will play a major role in 
achieving safety promotion in Lake Victoria, and in 
raising public confidence in these servises.
Last but not least, serious casualties involving lake 
crafts should be placed under the responsibility of a 
Marine Tribunal according to the recommendations made in 
ch.5 < under 5.6 ). The Tribunal should also look into all 




The other departments in Kenya co-ordinating some 
functional roles related to Maritime Administration and 
which may be consulted for relevant and / or expert advice 
during marine casualty investigations are :
- The Kenya Navy under the Office of the President, 
conducting Search and Rescue operations, marine 
casualties and marine surveillance.
- The police in protection of the territorial waters 
and the economic exclusive zone among others
- Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife involved in 
fisheries
- Ministry of Environment for marine protection
- Ministry of Commerce
- Ministry of Industry
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ministry of Labour and
- The Attorney General's Office.
Classification functions pertaining to port state 
control, surveys and certification, among others, have 
been delegated to various classification societies listed 
below. The qualified staff engaged by these societies are 
also, when required, involved in casualty investigations
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as expert witnesses and as sources of technical 
information not available elsewhere in the country.
The Lloyd's Register of Shipping
Det Norsk Veritas
Bureau Veritas
American Bureau of Shipping 
Germansches Lloyd
A Greek Classification society and,
A Japanese classification society.
Remarks.
Since Kenya's maritime activity and participation in 
domestic and international shipping have increased, there 
is a need for reviev; and updating of the existing maritime 
administration. The objective is establishment of a new 
structure which would best meet the needs of the marine 
communuty to date. A proposal for a nev/ Department under 
the Ministry of Transport and Communications, equal in 
status and autonomy to the departments responsible for 
Meteorological and Civil Aviation services ( under the 
same Ministry ), is a major recommendation of this paper. 
Although this is a proposal which is already being 
discussed at high government levels and has reached an 
advanced stage, there is a need for this paper to 
recognize and emphasise its importance to Kenya's maritime
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needs and thus its indispensability. More details relating 
to the Department are to be found in ch. 2 under 2.2. (
Annex 1 > provides the organizational chart of the 




PROCEDURE / SYSTEM FOR THE INVESTIGATIONS INTO MARINE 
CASUALTIES - THE PRESENT SITUATION
2.1 THE MERCHANT SHIPPING OFFICE INVESTIGATIONS.
General overview.
The Merchant Shipping office is currently headed by the 
Merchant Shipping Superintendent, an officer holding a 
master mariner ( foreign going ) certificate obtained in 
the United Kingdom. Initially he was working as a pilot 
with KPA. He is assisted by an assistant shipping 
Superintendent v/ho also holds a master mariner 
certificate. They both have a Master of Science degree in 
Maritime Safety Administration MSA (N) from the World 
Maritime University. These officers are assisted by a 
Statistician, a general Maritime Administrator, clerical 
and secretarial staff.
The two surveyors are the only casualty investigators 
in this office, namely:-
(a) The merchant shipping superintendent and
<b) The assistant merchant shipping superintendent
Further the office accommodates two sections, commrcial 
and shipping, which undertake different functions, making 
the workload of the two surveyors much heavier.
Casualty investigations fall under the shipping section 
whose responsibility is promotion of safety of life and 
property at sea and the protection of the marine
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environment. The Merchant Shipping Superintendent's office 
therefore handles both the commercial and the shipping 
aspects of this office. However, all matters pertaining to 
safety of shipping are delegated to the assistant Shipping 
Superintendent. This is the officer who conducts marine 
casualty investigations more or less single handedly.
This is a very limited number of investigators who are 
more or less overburdened with their responsibilities of 
promotion of safety i.e surveys / inspections, issuance of 
safety certificates, inquiries into shipping casualties 
and all other aspects affecting safety. For instance, 
there have been frustrations over the officers inability 
to effectively control the safety standards of the large 
number of small commercial boats. Practically, once the 
owners pay their little licensing fees, they are left on 
their ovm, due to inadequacy of officers to follow up and 
control these boats.
Inadequacy in coping with these responsibilities can 
not be ignored and especially when the long coast and 
shoreline of the country is taken into account. Coupled 
with this is the limited awareness of the population about 
shipping safety.
t
In order for the above situation and the suggestions 
made in ch.1 under ( 1.6 ) to be improved and realized 
respectively, a Department of Shipping and Maritime 
Safety, directly responsible to the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications should be established in Mombasa. This 
will overhaul the inadequate existing arrangement, whereby 
the Merchant Shipping Superintendent is answerable both to 
the Ministry and KPA, thereby eliminating the undesirable 
bureaucracy in the current organizational structure. The 
officer heading the proposed Department could be
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designated as the Director - Chief Surveyor and the powers 
to implement and enforce technical requirements such as 
surveys / inspections of ships for issuance of safety 
certificates, and inquiries into shipping casualties etc 
should be entrusted to the new department.
The department should also be suitably staffed with 
officers having a good marine background and possessing a 
master mariners / Chief marine engineer's certificate of 
competency. Qualified staff for handling the 
administrative, shipping, legal, financial and other 
functions of the department should also be made available. 
Considering the shortage of officers possessing these 
qualifications in the country, it could be started with a 
few officers and gradually be strengthened in the future 
through transfers of the MSS to the department and other 
trained staff from KPA. Further more, candidates for 
training would be identified and trained as staff of the 
Maritime Safety Administration and Shipping Department.
( Annex 1 refers )
The nev7 department's establishment will play an 
important role in controlling shipping operations and 
promoting safety in the^ territorial waters of Kenya. 
Because of the large number of people involved 
particularly in commercial shipping, the increasing number 
of those who board a ferry every morning and evening to 
and from v/ork, school, business, pleasure, etc, very many 
lives would be at risk if appropriate measures were not 
taken to safeguard marine safety in Kenya. The department 
will therefore be better placed to undertake effective 
safety promoting functions and carry safety evaluations 
and analysis of the present safety deficient situation.
It will look into the enforcement of casualty reporting 
requirements vrhich have not shown signs of improvement.
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Operators of mostly unregistered vessels still lack the 
awareness to report incidents as they fear being 
apprehended or denied their licence to operate. The 
department should embark on educating mariners and the 
public on the benefits of reporting casualties for their 
own safety and that of their property. Perhaps it should 
try to impose penalties / fines on owners and operators 
who fail to report casualties involving their vessels.
It will give more attention to casualties whenever they 
occur. There has been a general lack of sensitivity by the 
authorities and the media in reporting to the public the 
occurrence of casualties particularly those involving 
single or few losses of life. For example, when fishermen 
go out in bad weather or on unseaworthy boats to earn a 
living, and lose their lives in the process, it is barely 
reported and many cases have gone unnoticed. It is a 
serious situation which has come to be viewed as a normal 
fact of life, even by the families and communities of the 
fishermen. It is an area that the Department should focus 
its attention on.
The new department will enhance and strengthen the 
technical capabilities of MARAD. It will provide staff 
with Marine engineering and Nautical qualifications, as 
well as Maritime lawyers and others lacking in the MSS 
office. The required personnel who would assist inter 
alia, in gathering, maintaining and coordinating marine 
casualty data, evaluation and analysis could be made 
avallable.
It will undertake the legal and other related 
activities involved in the ratification of the conventions 
which the Ministry of Transport and.Communications may 
advise the Government to recognise.
Review and revision of the Merchant Shipping Act, 
pursuant to the recommendations in chapters 1 and 5, is a
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realization that could effectively be achieved through the 
initiative and work of this department.
There will be coordination by the Department with KRC 
in initiating safety improvement projects and 
undertakings e.g updating training programmes, 
recommendations for advanced training of mariners engaged 
on Lake Victoria, inspections / surveys review and 
development of appropriate safety promoting procedures and 
guidelines.
2.2 CASUALTY AND ACCIDENT REPORTS.
The majority of marine casualties / accidents are 
reported by a vessel ov/ner / master or any other person 
involved to the MSS office through the Mombasa Radio Coast 
station or directly through a written letter stating all 
the details of the vessel. The Minister of Transport and 
Communications is then informed through the MSS office, 
while the Managing Director of KPA is also notified.
The MSS is the empowered authority over investigations 
into any marine casualty within the jurisdiction of the 
government or'wherever a Kenyan registered vessel is 
involved ( as provided under the Merchant Shipping Act - 
Annex 3 ). Following a casualty report, he would 
immediately initiate action and institute a preliminary 
investigation. His fundamental purpose is finding the 
cause(s) of the casualty in order to avoid a future 
recurrence. He also plays an important role in identifying 
a mariner who may have erred either through negligence or 
incompetence in contributing to the casualty, since the 
MSS is also the one responsible for maritime safety and 
therefore enforcing the relevant regulations.
Preliminary investigations are fact finding oriented
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and witnesses who can assist in the investigations are 
interviewed and their statements are obtained by the 
investigator( Nautical Surveyor). The first goal is to get 
as many facts as possible e.g details of the ship, details 
of crev7, details of cargo, documents, and statements. The 
idea of the investigator here is trying to build up a 
picture in his mind and get as much information as 
possible. Documents and statements are the two sources 
mostly available.
Interviews are mostly informal unless otherwise 
requested by the witnesses who are nevertheless denied 
legal representation by their lawyers. During interviews, 
only the interviev/ee and v/hen necessary his lawyer are 
allowed to the designated interview place. When the police 
is involved, hov/ever , witnesses are interviewed 
separately. When statements are produced they are usually 
read back before they are signed by v/itness. The language 
mostly used is Einglish but whenever Swahili speaking 
witnesses are called, interpreters are present to assist 
in recording statements. Each witness who has given 
recorded evidence is allowed to maintain a copy. Witness 
statements could be used during a formal investigation if 
it is deemed necessary by the investigating office, thus
Jproviding no special privilege to witness statements.
Photographs are taken whenever deemed necessary. Charts 
and other relevant facts are collected and analysed in an 
attempt to explore and arrive at the cause.
The investigator holding a preliminary investigation is 
provided under the Act, section 265, with the pov/ers of a 
surveyor and can go onboard ship at all reasonable times 
and inspect it or any part of its machinery or equipment 
or any certificate of a master mate or engineer. He 
however, has no powers to compel witness testimony under
30
oath nor the production of required documents during 
investigations.
A preliminary ’inquiry culminates in a report prepared 
on completion of the investigations exclusively by the 
investigator. All the observations of the facts 
surrounding the casualty, his conclusions and 
recommendations are incorporated into the report. This 
report is strictly confidential and is only available 
to the MSS office and the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. If and when the police make a request to 
this office for assistance, they too require a copy. The M 
D - KPA, is also provided with a copy for records. In the 
distribution of this report, a cover letter addressed by 
the investigator would always stress that the contents of 
the report are confidential. This is a restriction which 
could be for reasons of allaying any possibility of 
prejudice prior to a formal inquiry, if decided upon by 
the preliminary investigator and or the Minister.
Other parties involved in a casualty do not get copies 
of the investigations report and they may only see it when 
a formal inquiry is held.
2.2.1 FORMAL INQUIRIES.
Formal inquiries are ordered by the Minister v;ho may 
appoint a Judge, a Magistrate or a senior public officer 
to be a commissioner, and may not necessarily be preceded 
by a preliminary inquiry.
The basic criteria used for holding a formal inquiry 
are:
1. A serious casualty usually causing considerable 
public outcry, and great concern, resulting to 
considerable loss of life and property. In a case like
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this the Minister can order that a formal inquiry be 
carried out straight away thus dispensing with the 
preliminary inquiry. On the other hand, a decision for 
a formal inquiry into less serious casualties will be 
determined by the advice given by the investigator 
conducting the preliminary investigation.
2. Where a master, mate, pilot or engineer is charged 
with incompetence, misconduct or default while 
serving on board a Kenyan ship, or on board any 
other ship on or near the coast of Kenya or in the 
course of voyage to a port in Kenya.
A formal inquiry follows more or less a judicial 
process with a Commissioner usually a Judge of the High 
Court of Kenya presiding. He v/ould be assisted by one or 
more assessors of Nautical engineering / Marine expatriate 
appointed with the Minister's approval.
The Commissioner has got the pov;ers of a Commissioner 
in Kenya. He also has got pov/er to suspend or revoke 
certificates or to criticize the conduct of any party 
involved in a casualty. This usually involves officers or 
pilots whose certificates may be in jeopardy, shipowners
i
for engaging on incompetent crew and the Maritime 
Administration itself for safety deficiencies. A counsel 
is also appointed, he is usually a senior state counsel 
appearing for the state. The major concern of a formal 
inquiry is usually the determination of cause or causes 
and whether it was caused or contributed to by the 
wrongful act or default of any party. The parties involved 
are allowed to be represented by their own lawyers 
according to their own arrangements. As in preliminary 
investigations, interpreters are also appointed for the 
witnesses who may have difficulties in understanding the
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language used, usually English and Kiswahili.
After hearing complete evidence from witnesses and 
making conclusions, the Commissioner prepares a full 
confidential report and submits it to the Minister. Such a 
report would include, the findings on the causes and 
contributory factors of the casualty, his decision as to 
disciplinary measures, i.e suspension or revocation of an 
officer's or engineer's certificate or a pilots licence. 
The Commissioner further includes recommendations or 
actions to be taken in order to prevent a similar 
occurrence from happening again and to promote safety at 
sea.
After the report is received by the Minister, a 
statement is made to the media with effect to the 
conclusions made. However, the report is not released to 
the public. Parties involved are nevertheless free to take 
whatever legal action they may deem necessary to settle 
liability or other related cases in court afterwards.
An appeal by an officer, an engineer, or pilot from a 
decision involving a certificate's suspension or 
revocation can be made to a court to decide on the appeal. 
Such an appeal is permitted "v/here on an investigation a 
decision has been given to the cancelling or suspension of 
a certificate / licence or an application for the 
investigation to be re held under this section has not 
been or has been refused----- "
The Minister can order the investigation to be re held 
by the same Commissioner or by a nev/ly appointed one, who 
may be assisted by the same assessors or by different 
ones, whenever there is new evidence or there is suspicion 
of miscarriage of justice.
Perhaps it is important to note here the fact that 
formal investigations generally require long hearings
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sometimes running into months. For example, the "Harrier" 
formal investigation ran from July 1989 to April 1990, and 
had taken the authorities from 5th August, 1988 to 18th 
July, 1989 to decide on a formal investigation Commission. 
Such lengthy inquiries involve costly processes for all 
the parties involved. Nevertheless, they are easily 
conducted than recommendations are implemented due to the 
equally substantial financial expenses subsequently 
involved. Interviev7s conducted with safety officers 
indicated that the industry would need time to make funds 
available for such implementation of casualty 
recommendations, i.e training of small vessels crew, 
procurement, installation and maintenance of safety 
equipment.
For those small vessels, such as fishing boats and 
canoes, operating within various waters in Kenya,■related 
safety recommendations made in casualty reports may prove 
impossible to implement due to the high expenditure 
involved. Further more, there are restrictions and 
frustrations usually experienced by safety promoting 
officers in their enforcement of safety regulations. 
Sometimes safety enforcement efforts have been 
misunderstood to be interference v/ith the shipping 
business by the operatcrrs and members of the public. This 
behaviour is attributable to the general unav/areness of 
safety, because some involved parties also have some 
influence in the industry and they may use their influence 
to block safety enforcement efforts. Other vessel 
operators are involved in cheating malpractices such as 
borrowing safety equipment which their vessels lack. The 
aim is to merely present them during safety inspections in 
a desperate attempt to prove their adherence to 
regulations.
The above problems provide the reasons v/hy vessels less
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than 25 tons gomprise those with the highest casualties in 
the country.
2.2.2 DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS.
The Minister may also order a formal inquiry for 
disciplinary purposes, to examine whether a master, mate, 
or engineer is incompetent, has been guilty of an act or 
misconduct, drunkness or tyranny, has caused through his 
wrongful act or default, the loss of or a serious damage 
•to a ship or the loss of life, has been guilty of a 
criminal offense, or has failed to render assistance in a 
case of collision. Such hearings are held before a person 
appointed by the Minister v/ho is given the powers of a 
surveyor under the Act. These hearing's reports are made 
to the Minister and recommendations are also made to him 
as to whether or not certificates of the parties concerned 
should be suspended or cancelled. The Minister then takes 
the final decision depending on the recommendations given.
Remarks.
The major purpose of casualty investigations should be 
the determination of casualty cause(s) or probable causes. 
Knowledge on how a casualty occurred and why it occurred 
is perhaps the most essential prerequisite for the 
development of appropriate corrective measures, 
regulations, standards of safety, and perhaps review of 
existing regulations / legislation in order to achieve the 
internationally required safety standards. According to 
accident reports examined during research, most marine 
casualties in Kenya have been concluded to have been
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caused by human error. This implies a justification for 
recognition and ratification of the STCW convention 1978, 
as earlier recommended.
It is the Merchant Shipping Superintendent's office 
which is responsible for safety promotion through 
enforcement of regulations, as well as investigations into 
marine casualties. Therefore, determination of violation 
of law / regulations by this office during investigations 
and the subsequent institution of civil penalty action to 
responsible persons should not be underestimated, since 
this is an essential characteristic of enforcement of law.
Several shortcomings have been noted in the preceding 
casualty investigations legislation and procedures. 
Solutions to these problems listed belov? are provided in 
the recommendations in ch.5.
- Too much secrecy
- Inquiries into serious casualties ( formal ) take far 
too long and involve high costs in producing results.
- Formal Investigations are 
qualified persons instead 
persons.




MARINE CASUALTY INVESTIGATIONS - SAFETY 
PROMOTING AIM.
3.1 DEFINITION OF CASUALTY.
As provid©d for in the United Kingdom Merchant Shipping 
(accident investigation) regulations of 1989, and widely 
applicable in many other countries, an accident 
in general terms covers any contingency whereby
1. There is loss of life or major injury to any 
board, or any person is lost from, a ship or 
boat; or
2. A ship is lost or presumed to be lost, or is 
or materially damaged; or
3. A ship strands or is in collision; or
4. A ship is disabled; or
5. Any material damage is caused by a ship.(11)
t
3.2 TYPES OF MARINE CASUALTIES.
Every marine casualty is more or less a unique 
occurrence in itself. The circumstances surrounding one 
casualty cannot be exactly the same as those around 
another casualty, therefore making them different, 
however small the difference could be. Marine casualties 









- Fire or explosion,
Cargo / property damage,
- Chemical or oil spills.
3.3 TYPES OF CASUALTY INVESTIGATIONS.
The following general groups of casualty investigations 
have been V7idely identified and accepted as the most 
common types of marine casualty investigations:
1. Safety investigation, usually conducted by the Maritime 
Safety Administration. This form of investigation 
further employs two more types of investigations i.e 
Preliminary and Formal inquiries.
t
2. Disciplinary investigation, also conducted by the 
Safety Administration but quite often by another person 
designated for this purpose other than the safety 
investigator.
3. Criminal investigation, carried out by the Department- 
of Justice to punish criminal acts.
4. Civil liability investigation, by interested parties 
usually represented by lawyers and aimed at settling 
liability claims.
These marine investigations are, however, generally
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Carefully conducted investigations on the circumstances 
and conditions of a collision between two vessels or 
between a vessel and an installation, for instance, may 
reveal the cause(s) and it is usually unlikely that only 
one party contributed to the occurrence. The contributory 
factors and wrong procedures identified by the 
investigations will, subsequently, lead to necessary 
action being taken to reduce the chances of similar 
accidents happening again.
A casualty caused by defects in the design, structure 
of a ship or failure of machinery will require careful 
examination for causes to be established by expert 
investigators who need to have no direct connection nor 
personal interests in it. They need to know whether the 
casualty v/as caused by defects in the design and 
construction of a ship for instance, or by repair and 
maintenance or defects in the buoyancy, stability, 
freeboard, strength of the hull or failure of the 
equipment on board ship. All or any of these could be the 
contributing factors. The ansvrer to such vital questions ^ 
could contribute to remedial measures being taken. For 
example, the " Amoco Cadiz" casualty investigation 
identified at least six design faults v/ith a defective 
steering gear acting as the major cause.
Investigations of circumstances leading to a foundering 
sometimes even in the case of a vessel sinking without 
trace of survivors, can yield useful information like 
confirmation of the fact, approximate position, and 
apparent causes. The sinking of the Muncher , a six year 
old West German Lash barge carrier in the North Atlantic
aimed at maritime safety and disciplinary issues.
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in a severe storm with the loss of all on board on or 
about 12th Dec. 1978, while on a voyage from Rotterdam 
with a cargo of steel products, is a good example.
Fire and explosion are highly dangerous on an oil 
tanker because of the flammable nature of oil. These two 
being the most dreaded dangers at sea have in the past 
received thorough investigation, not only for the 
settlement of the subsequent claims but more importantly 
for the lessons available from the casualty investigation. 
Investigations are important because they arrive at 
remedial actions such as new requirements / regulations. 
For example, the SOLAS requirement to provide inert gas 
systems on tankers followed a series of disastrous 
explosions v/ithin one month on the VLCCs " Mactra", 
Marpessa"and the "Hony Haakon VII", and thus is a benefit 
of casualty investigations.
As a consequence of the "Herald of Free Enterprise" 
disaster, investigations of marine casualties, v/hich had 
traditionally been the responsibility of the marine 
surveyors of the Department of Transport - Marine 
Directorate, v/as handed over to the nev7 body named the 
Marine Accident Investigations Branch established in 1989 
as an independent arm of the Department of Transport. Its 
role is to investigate accidents at sea, on board ships 
and dangerous occurrences at sea to determine what caused 
an accident in order to prevent it happening again.
The "Derbyshire" casualty of the four year old OBO (Ore
Bulk Oil) vessel of the United Kingdom registry, v?ith the
loss of all 44 on board, serves as a good example. The %need for a formal investigation was not recognized and 
appreciated by the authorities concerned until her sister
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ship, the "Kowloon Bridge" was lost under different 
conditions off S.W Ireland.
Since the basic cause(s) of an accident and the action 
necessary to ensure that it will not happen again does not 
always become clear from the physical facts of the case, 
fs-ctors which may have influenced the actions should 
be examined. For example, some failure in the engine room 
or steering equipment may be due to an inspection failure 
or to faulty inspection techniques by a classification 
society, or when human error appears as a possible cause 
of the accident.
3.4 PURPOSE OF SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS.
The main purpose of an inquiry / investigation into a 
shipping casualty is to :
1. Ascertain the facts,
2. Obtain all relevant information, and
3. Determine as precisely as possible the cause / causes 
of the casualty so as to enable the Maritime Safety 
Administration to take necessary steps to prevent, as 
far as practicable, the occurrence of similar 
casualties in the future.
Investigations enable suggestions to be made for the 
correction of any wrong procedures that may be uncovered. 
Occurrences of casualties clearly indicate shortcomings in 
the design and construction of ships and in their 
servicing. It is easiest "to learn through bitter 
experience but it is very expensive and sometimes most
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painful" ( Professor J.W Doerffer ).(12) Opportunities 
would be missed if we did not analyse accidents in order 
to learn the lessons worth obtaining. A.F Harrold in a 
paper presented "on the investigation of marine 
casualties" to the Institute of Marine Engineers agrees 
that "without question, bad experience is salutary and 
provides the richest source of learning and thus obviates 
repeating the mistakes of others".(13) It could, therefore 
, be concluded that, conducting comprehensive fair 
investigations without infringing on the legal rights of 
the witnesses, and bringing out a useful report in good 
time, enables a profitable use of the lessons offered by 
the accident.
Casualty investigations are further undertaken for the 
purpose of compliance with the legal requirements of the 
relevant maritime authorities.
Marine casualty safety investigations are also aimed at 
restoring public confidence and reliability of sea 
transport, particularly considering the risk of damage by 
dangerous cargo and or oil to human life and to the marine 
environment as well.
Casualty investigations also aim at establishing blame 
and liability and if necessary punish or provide damage 
compensation.
Marine casualty safety investigations have adopted two 
widely appl ie*d * stagf s




This inquiry should be conducted by a responsible 
officiaKs) with the necessary expertise and duly notified 
as the proper officer for the purpose by the Maritime 
Administration (usually under the Merchant Shipping Act). 
This stage can be said to be quasi -judicial in nature, 
where the preliminary investigating officer has the duty 
to :
C 1. Inform the government / Ministry concerned of the 
\ shipping casualty having occurred within its 
\ jurisdiction.
I 2. Hold a preliminary investigation, when considered 
necessary, into the shipping casualty.
3. Submi^ the proceedings and report of the preliminary 
inquiry to the Ministry.
4. Make an appl ication_^ tq_ ji.cjjjjrt ( or commissioner 
empowered under the Merchant Shipping Act) jf.QH a 
formal inyestlga.tion into the casualty if he 
considers it necessary and if the government directs 
him to do so.
A preliminary investigating officer needs to be a 
highly experienced professional, properly trained for the 
task, and appreciative; of the' solemn duty being 
undertaken. By virtue of his designation, he would 
further be obliged to :
1. Show great patience and understanding in examining 
witnesses, since they are likely to have been through 
a traumatic experience.
2. Remember to place himself "in the shoes " of the
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witness when recording his statement in order to 
understand the relevant circumstances properly.
3. Appreciate the fact that his conclusions / 
recommendations may have far reaching consequences 
affecting the career(s) of the seafarer<s) concerned 
and perhaps, the ship owners themselves.
4. Distinguish clearly between "error of judgement" and 
"negligence" as regards his conclusion regarding an 
act of omission or commission on the part of any 
seafarer concerned.
5. Remember the purpose and objectives of the inquiry.
6. Ensure that the proceedings and the report of the 
inquiry are such as to be capable of forming a proper 
basis for the decision of his government as regards 
further follow up action(s).
When it has been considered necessary by the 
investigating officer for a preliminary inquiry to be 
conducted, it becomes his responsibility to perform the 
following duties :
1. To board the vessel involved and inspect any of the 
machinery, boats, equipment or articles on board 
without detaining or delaying the vessel from 
proceeding on any voyage unless deemed necessary.
This should be however, within the jurisdiction of 
the state.
2. To enter and inspect any premises considered 
necessary and relevant for the purpose of the report 
the investigator is directed to make.
3. To summon witnesses and request answers as deemed
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necessary for the purpose.
4. To require and enforce the production of all books, 
papers, documents and any other evidence considered 
necessary and important for the purpose.
5. To administer oaths or require any person to be
examined by him to make and subscribe a declaration 
of the truth of the statement made by him in his 
examination.
Perhaps it should be deemed desirable for the Maritime 
Safety Administration to control the power to administer 
oaths by issuance of clear orders / instructions to 
preliminary inquiry officers who may be lacking legal 
training or judicial experience. Also for those vritnesses 
who may not understand the implications of making 
statements under "oath" to be informed in case some of the 
facts and evidence may be used in a formal investigation, 
or litigation before court.
Also the pov/er to "summon" tho'se witnesses whose 
attendance cannot be ensured through normal communication 
forms needs also to be made clear through similar 
instructions as above.
Considering preliminary inquiri 
departmental purposes, their repor 
made public in most countries. Thi 
disseminating inquiry findings has 
inadequate in providing the lesson 
through the reports of the circums 
casualty. Although interested part 
apply for copies, this defeats the 
investigation.
es have been mostly for 
ts have usually not been 
s method of 
been found to be 
s that are available, 
tances surrounding a 
ies do however, often 
major purpose of the
45
3.4.2 FORMAL INVESTIGATIONS.
A formal investigation should be a public or judicial 
inquiry held in addition to or instead of a preliminary 
inquiry as may be decided by a government. It could be 
held by a court < or commissioner ), or a Board empowered 
under the Merchant Shipping Act < of the country involved 
), The commissioner should be assisted by assessors with 
the appropriate expertise who are designated by the court 
( or commissioner) from a panel maintained by MARAD or by 
an appropriate court for the purpose.
Usually, a formal investigation is ordered by a 
government < or the official in charge of the Maritime 
Safety Administration duly appointed ) to be held in any 
of the following circumstances :
1. If the preliminary inquiry has not been considered 
suf ficient.
2. If it appears that the shipping casualty has occurred 
through an avoidable cause.
3. If it appears likely to lead to the prevention of 
similar casualties in the future.
4. If the casualty resulted in a serious damage to 
property or loss of life or property.
5. If the casualty has given rise to a substantial 
amount of public attention or to a disturbance of 
public confidence.
6. If there has been any alleged default or negligence
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on the part of the master or any officer.
7. If a certificate of competency of an officer
(including a master ) is likely to be dealt with.
When, during a formal investigation evidence of 
criminal conduct or behaviour in violation of the laws of 
the country has been identified, this evidence should be 
forwarded to the department of justice for further 
consideration and prosecution of the offenders.^
Formal investigations result only rarely, but when they 
do take place they are lengthy, taking several months in 
some cases, hence being costly. However, they are valuable 
in so far as the fundamental purpose of a casualty 
investigation is to learn lessons. The opportunity of 
learning lessons is lost unless they are disseminated to 
the marine community. There is no more effective way of 
achieving this than through a public inquiry.
A good example is the formal inquiry held by the 
British government into the "Kurdistan" disaster after 
considerable pressure |'rom the Canadian authorities who 
were concerned with the oil pollution threat in their 
v^aters. This inquiry lasted 10 weeks and is said to have 
cost 1 million and only established a badly repaired 
bilge keel as having caused the vessel to break into two.
A conclusion vrhich could have been reached through a 
sensible and cheap preliminary procedure.
The several factors indicated here under are known to 
reduce the value of a public inquiry and therefore should 
be treated carefully by investigators if positive and 
desired results are to be achieved.
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1. Withholding of relevant information to protect 
commercial or other interests by witnesses or owners 
who may reveal less information than the amount 
available.
2. The instinctive in - built protective mechanisms 
sometimes exercised involuntarily by humans.
3. The idea of tampering with, concealment or even 
destruction of evidence whether intentionally or 
otherwise.
4. Lack of or unavailability of relevant expertise and 
professional assistance since it is unlikely that one 
person vrould have all the answers.
This is when the investigator's expertise, professional 
experience, patience and understanding are put to the test 
and it should be his duty to use his knowledge on 
interviev/ techniques, legal rights of .witnesses, 
administration of oaths to get the information he deems
shelpful for the investigations.
3.5 INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.
The main purpose of IMO activities is to increase 
safety at sea. This is a complex task involving life, 
cargo and the marine environment in general. Large 
improvements in safety are brought about by learning 
lessons from casualties inter alia. This has been the 
major reason why IMO member parties to its conventions
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have been required to investigate casualties and report to 
the organization in this regard.
The investigation and reporting obligations required 
from the member states are to be found in the following 
extracts from the respective international conventions.
These instruments are, however, binding only when 
adopted by IMO members states.
1. The International Convention for Safety of
Life at Sea, ( SOLAS 1974/78 ), for example, require 
in Chapter 1 ( Reg.21), that each 
administration :
- Undertakes to conduct an investigation of any 
casualty occurring to any of its ships subject to 
the-provisions of the present convention, when it 
judges that such an investigation may assist in 
determining v/hat changes in the present regulations 
might be desirable.
- Each contracting government, undertake to supply the 
organization with pertinent information concerning 
the findings of such investigation. No reports or 
recommendations of the organization based upon such 
information shall disclose the identity or 
nationality of the ships or in any manner fix or 
imply responsibility upon any ship or person.
The obligations expressed under the above convention 
from a party state to investigate a casualty and report to 
IMO sounds conditional. It is dependent upon a party 
state's sole decision as to whether or not an 
investigation may assist in bringing about changes to the 
convention. Further more the obligation applies to SOLAS 
ships only. However, it recognises the sovereignty of a
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party state and its responsibility for investigating 
casualties within its jurisdiction.
2. Under the ILO - Minimum Standards Convention 1976,
No. 147 Art. 2 (g>, each member undertakes to hold an 
official inquiry into any serious marine casualty 
involving ships registered in its territory, 
particularly those involving injury and or loss of 
life. The final report of such an inquiry normally to 
be made public.
This applies only to member flag states jurisdiction to 
hold investigations into serious casualties involving 
ships under their registries. The obligation further 
recognises the need for the publicity of a casualty 
investigation report.
3. Under the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, 
1982, Art.94(7), each state shall cause an inquiry to 
be held by or before a suitably qualified person or 
persons into every marine casualty or incident of 
navigation on the^high seas, involving a ship flying 
its flag and causing loss of life or serious injury 
to nationals of another state, or serious damage to 
ships or installations of another state, or to the 
marine environment. The flag state and the other 
state shall cooperate in the conduct of any inquiry 
held by that other state into any such marine 
casualty or incident of navigation.
This applies to casualties occuring on the high seas 
and particularly involving a flag state's ships causing 
serious damage to another state's nationals, ships and 
installations and the marine environment. It does not
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include jurisdiction on investigations into casualties 
occuring within territorial waters. Cooperation between 
the two states is emphasised.
4. The Administration of a member state party to the 
international Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from ships, CMARPOL 73/78), undertakes, 
under Art.12, to conduct an investigation of any 
casualty occurring to any of its ships subject to the 
provisions of the regulations if such casualty has 
produced a major deleterious effect upon the marine 
environment.
Each party to the convention also undertakes to 
supply the organization with information concerning 
the findings of such investigations when it judges 
that such information may assist in determining what 
changes in the present convention might be desirable.
This provides jurisdiction to a flag state over 
investigations into casualties involving her ships causing 
serious pollution to the environment. However, this only 
applies to MARPOL shipp.
5. Under the international Convention on Load Lines,
1966, ( LL 66) Art. 23, each administration 
undertakes to conduct an investigation of any 
casualty occurring to ships for v^hich it is 
responsible, and which are subject to the provisions 
of the present convention, v/hen it judges that such 
an investigation may assist in determining what 
changes in the convention might be desirable.
Each contracting government also undertakes to supply 
the organization v/ith the pertinent information 
concerning the findings of such investigations. No
51
reports or recommendations of the organization based 
upon such information shall disclose the identity or 
nationality of the ships concerned or in any manner 
fix or imply responsibility upon any ship or person.
As in SOLAS, the requirement under this convention is 
conditional since it depends on the decision of a party 
state on whether or not a casualty investigation involving 
its ships is seen to assist in bringing about changes to 
the convention. It also apply to LL < 66 ) ships only.
A number of IMO resolutions have also been adopted 
( Annex 4 >. These resolutions provide recommendations 
which are however, not binding in any way, although party 
states would feel morally obligated to comply with them.
3.6 LESSONS LEA£U>IED.
International maritime conventions, the purpose of 
which is to prevent accidents at sea, can as a rule be 
said to have arisen or been strengthened as a result of 
such catastrophes as the loss of the "Titanic, Torrey 
Canyon, Amoco Cadiz and the Exxon Valdez " inter alia.
Thus some beneficial outcome of the lessons learned 
after some catastrophic disasters has indeed been achieved 
as follows.
1. In 1914, following the sinking of the "SS Titanic" in 
1912 with a heavy loss of life, 13 Nations attended a 
conference for the formulation and adoption of an 
international convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) covering such areas as safe construction, and use 
of radios in times of distress which never came into force
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because of the outbreak of the war however.
2. In 1929, 18 Nations participated at a follow up 
conference which adopted a convention providing a minimum 
standard of sub division, boatage, life saving appliances 
for passenger shipsr, and included a minimum recognition of 
structural fire protection, and also required the use of 
radio and adopted some regulations for the prevention of 
collisions at sea.
3. These were further improved,and strengthened at a 1948 
conference of 30 Nations with the adoption of grain and 
dangerous cargo regulations.
4. In 1960, another conference was convened following the 
tragic collision betv/een the "Andrea Doria" and the 
"Stockholm" in 1956. This aimed at dealing vrith the 
problems raised by development of inflatable life rafts. 
Existing requirements were also strengthened and several 
new ones covering stability, fire fighting, carriage of 
grain, life saving appliances and nuclear ships were also 
adopted. Further more, ^
- new requirements were introduced for survey of hull, 
machinery and equipment of cargo ships s^nd radio 
equipment.
- in cargo ships of 5000 gross tons and over, 
requirements calling for structural fire protection 
were introduced.(14)
5. The "Torrey Canyon" disaster off the English coast in 
March 1967, resulted in a spill of oil causing pollution 
damage of an extent previously unknovm. This incident made 
the world aware of the need for international regimes of 
liability and compensation for pollution damage caused by
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oil spills from tankers. Following this disaster, the IMO 
convened a diplomatic conference in Brussels in 1969, 
which adopted the International Convention of Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution damage which entered into 
force in 1975.
The Fund Convention adopted in 1971, and v^hich entered 
into force in 1978, was also a result of this incident.
6. During March 1977, the United States requested IMO to 
take international action to improve safety and pollution 
prevention measures after a series of tanker accidents in 
or near the United States coastal waters in the winter of 
1976 - 77.
As a result, the IMO, after intense preparation 
convened the International Conference on Tanker Safety and 
Pollution Prevention. Its purpose v/as to consider 
improving the provisions of two conventions developed four 
years previously, but which had not been implemented 
internationally, and was also meant to strengthen these 
earlier conventions, namely MARPOL 73 and SOLAS 74.
The product of this conference was the adoption of two 
instruments , commonly^referred to as the SOLAS protocol 
and the MARPOL protocol, hence the MARPOL 73/ 78, and 
SOLAS 74/ 78 as amended. Areas of concern such as radar, 
steering gear, inert gas system, surveys and VHF radio 
telephone were given attention.
7. The adoption of the International Convention on Oil 
Pollution Preparedness. Response and Cooperation 1990, was 
developed following a meeting of leaders of the major 
industrial nations in Paris which requested IMO to put 
forward proposals for further measures to prevent 
pollution. This is an important step aimed at improving 
the ability of coastal states to combat marine pollution
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and is a response to the lessons learned on how accidents 
like the ” Exxon Valdez" grounding in 1969, can cause 
disastrous oil spills with immense damage to the marine 
environment.
The main features of this convention are going to be
- oil pollution emergency plans.




OTHER COUNTRIES' LEGISLATION AND PRACTICES
General overview.
In this chapter, comparative examination of the United 
States' and United Kingdom's legislation and practices 
applicable to marine casualty investigations is taken into 
account. This examination is appreciated as very educative 
and revealing in many aspects, and could be useful in 
reaching the conclusions and recommendations in ch. 5.
Although objectives of casualty investigation systems 
differ from one country to another, they also differ from 
strictly penal systems ( e.g USCG - Admiftistrative Law 
Judges personnel hearings ) to systems only oriented 
tov/ards safety ( e.g NTSB's ) v/ithin a country's system, 
and between different countries as well.
The objectives pursued under the different systems, 
also directly affect the processes of investigations, 
their reports and their use to a less or greater degree, 
depending on whether they are geared tov/ards safety 
promotion or disciplinary objectives or both.
Several similar and common subjects to the three 
systems ( Kenya discussed in ch.1 and 2 ), U.S.A and U.K 
will be taken into account ).
These include :
-The different bodies with jurisdiction to investigate 
marine casualties, and relations,
-Casualties reported and investigated.
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-Purpose of marine casualty investigations.
-Investigations procedures, 
-Reports and their publications, 
-Role of safety recommendations.
4.1 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
The major agencies with jurisdiction to conduct (or 
cause to be conducted) marine casualty investigations 
under a dual type of a system are the National 
Transportation Safety Board and the United States Coast 
Guard. The Coast Guard carries out all marine casualty 
investigations while the NTSB investigates and determines 
the facts, conditions, circumstances and the cause or 
probable causeCs) of major marine casualties, casualties 
involving US public vessels and the Coast Guard's safety 
functions.
4.1.1 THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 
< NTSB ).
The NTSB was created by the Transportation Act of 1966 
as an agency of the US department of Transportation. 
Following the independent Safety Board Act of 1974, the 
Safety Board was established in 1975 as a totally 
independent agency with broadened responsibilities. It 
consists of five members who are appointed by the 
president of the United States with the advice and consent 
of the US Senate to serve a five years terms. The
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appointments are made in such a way that one term expires 
each year.
The Board seeks to ensure that all modes of 
transportation < Air, Highways, Marine, Pipeline and 
Railway) in the USA are operated safely, by investigating 
accidents, initiating and conducting safety studies, 
and issuing safety improvement recommendations. All 
Safety Board investigations are fact finding 
investigations. Nevertheless, compliance with Safety 
Board recommendations is voluntary.
The Board has no authority to conduct administrative, 
civil or criminal proceedings against parties involved in 
marine accidents, but it does, however, possess a review 
role with respect to actions taken by the US Coast Guard 
to suspend or revoke the licences or certificates of 
seamen.
The Board has jurisdiction to investigate maritime 
accidents which occur in US v;aters, regardless of the 
nationality of the ships involved, or v/hich involve a US 
registered ship. According to the joint regulations ( i.e 
US Code of federal regulations 46 ) applicable to the 
Board and the Coast Gukrd, the Safety Board is required to 
investigate accidents which result in :
1. The loss





of six or more lives;
of a mechanically - propelled vessel of more 
gross tons;
damage initially estimated at $ 500,000 or
threat to life, property, or the environment
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by hazardous materials;
5. Investigations of accidents involving US public
vessels and non - public vessels, which result in at 
least one fatality, more than $ 75,000 in property 
damage, or significant safety issues relating to 
Coast Guard safety functions and or its vessels.
The Board's other powers are to hold public hearings, 
sit and act at such times and places, administer oaths, 
require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of 
witnesses and production of evidence, enter any property, 
or wreckage where a casualty has occurred for the purpose 
of investigations, examine or test and obtain autopsy 
reports of individuals involved in casualties. (16)
4.1.2 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE.
In its efforts to achieve these objectives, the Board 
employs to great advantage, a technical party system in 
conducting marine investigations, to ensure the presence 
of the proper breadth ^nd depth of knowledge on various 
aspects. This of caurse depends upon having available a 
cadre of trained personnel by the Board.
The investigation parties are however, selected 
depending on their ability to provide technical expertise 
to assist in the investigation on various aspects and are 
designated by the Board as deemed necessary for each 
individual accident. Each party representative is assigned 
responsibilities and directed by the Board's investigator 
in charge. These representatives are usually suitable and 
qualified technical employees who are hov/ever, not allowed 
to represent claimants or insurers at the same time as
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investigations are being conducted.
In the event of an accident, there is usually a 
team" which proceeds to the scene of the accident 
immediately before evidence perishes or witnesses 
disperse. This "go team" consists of employees of the 
Board who have a wide range of professional expertise, 
commonly licensed deck or engineering officers, ship 
inspectors, metallurgists, meteorologists, hazardous 
materials experts, human performance specialists, survival 
factors specialists
When necessary, party representatives are also 
designated to participate in the initial on - scene 
investigation v/here v/reckage parts or failed machinery 
components are selected for further testing. Log books, 
course recorder tapes, charts, and other documentary 
evidence is collected, examined and analysed.
Also, v/hen possible, witnesses are interviev;ed by 
investigators at a convenient place near the accident 
scene shortly after an accident, before evidence is 
destroyed or interferred v?ith and witnesses disappear. If 
necessary subpoenas are issued and sv/orn testimony may be 
taken as well in order to ensure statements are based on
JFtrue knov/ledge of what happened and misinformation is 
avoided.
Meetings v/ith party representatives and investigators 
in - charge are held throughout the fact finding stage to 
ensure that all parties have an opportunity to review all 
evidence and testimony, and to ensure also that no 
important aspects of the investigation are overlooked.
A final technical review meeting is .then held to ensure 
that all parties are in agreement as to the pertinent 
facts uncovered. Parties are also invited to provide 
proposed analyses, conclusions, and recommendations for
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the Board to consider in the formation of its final 
report.
4.1.3 PUBLIC HEARINGS.
The Board sometimes holds fact finding public hearings 
in order for persons involved in an accident to testify 
and be questioned. In this case, a board of inquiry is 
established by the Safety Board and this board of inquiry 
is usually presided over by a Safety Board member.-During 
public hearings, witnesses are called to testify and be 
questioned under oath, while other parties involved in the 
accident are also invited to participate in the public 
hearing proceedings. These hearings are always public and 
are designed to help the Safety Board determine the cause 
of an accident and provide information on which the Safety 
Board may be able to develop recommendations to prevent 
other similar accidents.
4.1.4 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
f
After the conclusion of every major investigation, the • 
Safety Board determines the probable cause of the 
accident, issues a public report describing the facts, 
conditions, and circumstances of the accident, and makes 
safety improvement recommendations to prevent similar 
accidents in the future < recommendations submitted by the 
Board to the Secretary of the Department of Transportation 
and or other Agencies require a written response not later 
than 90 days after receipt ).
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V.
Investigation reports usually include the Safety 
Board's analysis of the facts of the accident and specific 
conclusions that may be drawn from the analysis.
Therefore, the Board's determination of an accident's 
probable cause is dependent on its analysis of the facts, 
conditions and circumstances surrounding the accident. 
Finally, identification of those factors which contributed 
to the accident are effected.
It should be noted here that the Board's investigation 
regulations prevent the use or admission into evidence of 
the Board's accident reports in any suit or action for 
damages arising from accidents.
4.1.5 REPORTS AND PUBLICATION,.
Marine accident investigation reports and safety 
studies are published by the Safety Board after completion 
of each investigation. It also makes annual reports to 
the U S congress regarding its accident investigations and 
r e c ommenda tion s.
4.2 THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD.
The Coast Guard, an agency of the department of 
transportation, has a broad range of maritime functional 
responsibilities including, inter alia the following :
. Vessel inspection and certification,
. Licensing and certification of personnel.
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. Federal pilotage.
. Vessel traffic management,
. Regulations and their enforcement,
. Search and rescue and,
. Full jurisdiction to investigate all marine 
casualties.(17)
The Commandant is in full charge of the agency and 
below him are various offices, amongst these is the office 
of the Marine Safety, Security and Environmental 
Protection. This is headed by a Chief and consists of six 
more divisions i.e the Marine Technical and Hazardous 
Materials, Merchant Vessels Inspection and Documentation, 
Merchant Vessel Personnel, Marine Investigations, Port 
Safety, Security and Marine Environment Response.
The District Commander in the field, supervises the 
Administration of the Marine Safety Division offices which
fall under this office, as well as the Officer in Charge
/
of Marine Inspection - the OCMI.
According to the Code of Federal Regulations 46 and the 
Marine Safety Manual, the Coast Guard's casualty 
investigations are carried out in order to determine the 
following :
1. What caused the casualty;
2. Whether any misconduct / negligence etc by licensed / 
documented mariners contributed to it;
3. Whether there is need for further investigations;
4. Whether any misconduct of any other person including 
Coast Guard employees contributed to it;
5. Whether there was violation of laws / regulations 
which could initiate civil penalty action or 
reference to an Administrative law judgeCs) for 
criminal enforcement;
6. Whether there is need for changing existing law / 
regulations or initiating new ones to prevent similar 
incidents.
Coast Guard's investigations are, however, a means to 
promote safety of life and property at sea and to protect 
the marine environment. These marine investigations have 
been generally grouped into the following categories : -
1. Commercial vessel accidents ( marine casualties );
/2. Personnel conduct on the part of professional 
mariners holding licences, certificates, documents; 
and
3. General enforcement of laws / regulations.
4.2.1 MARINE CASUALTIES .
In the event of a marine accident, which further would 
result in :
64
. Loss of life and or serious injury, or
. Material property loss, or material damage affecting a
vessels seaworthiness.
The vessel's owner, agent, operator, and or person in 
charge there on, is required to report immediately to the 
nearest Coast Guard Marine Safety or. to a Marine 
Inspection office, failure to do so resulting in liability 
for a civil penalty of $ 1000.(18)
The Coast Guard's jurisdiction to investigate marine 
accidents extends to commercial vessels anywhere in the 
world and to foreign flag vessels in U S v/aters. In 
conducting marine casualty investigations, several 
procedures are employed by the Coast Guard, such as :
1. The vast majority of its investigations are treated as 
routine, C G - 2692 form reporting investigations. Here 
vessel, crev7, injuries, deaths, accident and location and 
a description of v/hat occurred as well as the best guess 
as to why / how it occurred are entered by the person 
reporting the casualty as earlier mentioned. The 
investigating officer then would review the form in an 
attempt to determine whether the information is complete 
and accurate. He would, subsequently, conduct preliminary 
interviews as required and then evaluate whether a more 
detailed investigation is necessary or not. When he 
decides that, the form and any other attachment is all 
that is required..He endorses the form indicating the 
apparent cause of the casualty.
2. In some cases, the C G - 2692 form is found to be
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inadequate in fully describing all the aspects of the 
casualty. As a result, therefore, a shorter cover letter 
called a Letter of Transmittal is used by the investigator 
who attaches it to the form. Most of these are one man 
investigator cases.
3. A few complex marine casualties are found to require a 
full Narrative Report where the investigator includes fact 
finding, conclusions and recommendations. This procedure 
is usually lengthy. Informal investigations are conducted 
with sworn testimonies from witnesses,
while involved parties are also allowed to participate and 
to be represented by their attorneys ( it should be noted 
that, all casualty investigations are reported to the 
Commandant either through a Narrative report. Letter of 
Transmittal or form 2692 as deemed applicable by the 
investigating officers involved ).
4. The biggest and or major casualties require direct 
notification to the Commandant and the District Commander 
who in turn reports to the NTSB. When NTSB requests C G to 
investigate a major casualty, on - scene investigations 
are carried out for fact finding purposes and 
determination of causes as mentioned earlier, and when 
necessary by holding public hearings. Public hearings are 
suggested by the District Commander and decided upon by 
the Commandant. Marine Boards of investigations are 
composed of two or three C G officers with inter alia, 
professional qualifications, marine safety background and 
experience. When C G conducts investigations under the 
request of NTSB, the NTSB would nominate its investigator 
who may call and examine witnesses and submit or request 
additional evidence. When the investigations report is 
completed, the Commandant will provide a record of the
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proceedings to the Safety Board which then issues its own 
report to the public.
4.2.2 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.
To avoid duplicative efforts in investigations 
involving the two Authorities, a memorandum of 
understanding was signed in 1981. This requires that, 
whenever a major casualty has occurred, one Authority may 
assume leading responsibility, while the other provides 
supportive participation. For instance, where there is 
extensive loss of life and or significant property damage 
involved, the NTSB would decide whether to participate in 
a joint C G -NTSB inquiry, do it alone or lead and conduct 
a formal inquiry under its own rules. The second option is 
quite prevalent in casualties v/here C G vessels are 
involved, thus removing the image of C G investigating 
itself. This resolves the conflict of interest problem 
which initially led to the establishment of the Safety 
Board.
Foreign flag vessel casualty investigations usually 
follov/ the same procedures but obviously vrith the 
knowledge and, when necessary, the participation of the 
nearest Consul office or P & I club representing the 
involved vessel. The investigator has powers to subpoena 
foreign witnesses if required to appear for examination 
and questioning, although he'cannot refer charges against 
them.
There is coordination with other Federal agencies in 
investigations. For example, on matters of'fires.
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explosions, and pollution, the Minerals Management Service 
would be involved, while others fall under the Department 
of Defense.
4.2.3 PERSONNEL INVESTIGATIONS ( DISCIPLINARY ).
The C G has also the jurisdiction, to suspend or revoke 
a licence / document when the holder is found to be 
negligent, or to have committed an act of misconduct etc 
as mentioned above. Mariners are charged with formal 
proceedings by investigators before Administrative Law 
judges. During such proceedings, mariners can be 
represented by a counsel who can call witnesses and 
produce evidence on their behalf.
Licences can be suspended for varying periods of time 
or revoked. However, in the event of either decision, 
mariners can appeal against the decision to the Commandant 
and even when unsatisfied with the outcome, to the NTSB. 
Mariners v/ho fail to show up for personnel cases are 
listed down in a Seaman Locator and or Seaman Wanted List 
for future tracing v/henever they show up in any port. (
fout of about 500 -1000 personnel incidents per year, 300 - 
400 of them result in formal suspension and revocation 
hearings >. The majority of disciplinary hearings held by 
ALJ's deal with misconduct on board, alcohol, drugs, and 
fight s.
General enforcement laws and regulations 
investigations, lead to civil and criminal penalty 
proceedings where C G Hearing officers take necessary 
action against violation of laws / regulations on the 
basis of available evidence before them. They then would
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decide on whether to dismiss a case, especially the ones 
lacking adequate evidence / proof or imposing penalty 
payments or reducing the penalty particularly when the 
respondent's response has been positive and satisfactory. 
Similarly, an appeal can be lodged to the Commandant 
whenever there is dissatisfaction on the part of a 
respondent for necessary re -consideration.
Conclusion.
Coast Guard Investigation recommendations initiate 
remedial action to correct specific safety problems found 
during investigations. A number of the recommendations are 
decided upon by the Commandant. For the broader safety 
implications, either suspected or not apparent, safety 
studies and analysis of the entire system are carried out, 
and necessary evaluation and identification of solutions 
by the relevant division are undertaken.
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4.3 UNITED KINGDOM:
Perhaps the United Kingdom has the longest history of 
casualty investigations which dates as far back as two 
centuries or more. Presently the United Kingdom casualty 
legislation has originated from the Merchant Shipping Act 
of 1894 which has been amended by various Acts, 
particularly the Merchant Shipping Act (1974), the 
Merchant Shipping Act (1979), the Merchant Shipping 
(Formal Investigations) Rules of 1985 and recently by the 
Merchant Shipping (Accident Investigation) Regulations 
1989.
This is the system upon v/hich the Kenyan Marine 
Casualty Investigations system is based, despite its lack 
of amendment during the past several years. It is a system 
which consists mainly of preliminary inquiries and formal 
investigations into marine accidents.
Under the present regulations, the Secretary of State 
is empowered to designate as Chief Inspector of Marine 
Accidents, any of the several appointed inspectors. His 
functional responsibilities include, making regulations 
regarding inter alia, the following: ‘
. Marine accidents definition,
. Purpose of investigations,
. Duty to report accidents,
. Ordering of investigations,
. Preservation of evidence.
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. Conduct of investigations.
. Submission of Inspector's enquiry report, 
. Summaries of investigations ,
. Reopening of investigations,
. Penalties, and others.
4.3.1 DUTY TO REPORT ACCIDENTS:
Under the current rules, the Master of any U.K 
registered ship and any other ship within U.K territorial 
waters, is required to send a report to the Chief 
Inspector of Marine Accidents currently heading the MAIB ( 
the Marine Accidents Investigations Branch). This report 
is expected as soon as is practicable and in any case not 
later than 24 hours after the ship's next arrival at port 
from when an accident occurs. Where a ship is lost or 
presumed lost or is abandoned, the owner or the Master or 
senior officer is obliged to report the accident as 
required above. Any casualty report made to a marine 
office or the department of transport or to H M Coastguard 
is also subject to the above requirements.
The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident 
under these regulations is to determine its circumstances 
and causes v?ith the aim of improving the safety of life at 
sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is 
not their purpose to apportion liability nor blame unless 
this contributes to the achievement of the above purpose.
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4.3.2 THE MARINE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATIONS BRANCH.
< MAIB >
The establishment of this new body in 1989, which is 
specifically charged with the duty to investigate marine 
accidents, created an independent arm of the Department of 
Transport, reporting directly to the Secretary of State 
for Transport.
The MAIB is empowered to investigate :
. Accidents at sea and on board ships and
Dangerous occurrences at sea.
This Board took over investigations of marine accidents 
previously conducted by the staff of the Department's 
Marine Directorate who were specifically appointed as 
inspectors for the purpose under the Merchant Shipping 
Act .
The Board aims to determine what caused an accident in 
order to prevent it from happening again. Its staff 
composed of professional inspectors and experienced 





This new set up requires that MAIB is advised at the 
earliest opportunity after an occurrence. Where serious
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accidents are concerned, reports are required to be made 
initially by the quickest means e.g by Telephone or 
Telefax, to the Branch and any other office of the 
Department of Transport or H M Coastguard.
After accident reports are received here, they are 
immediately referred to an inspector for a decision on 
what action is to be taken. Normally, the type and 
severity of the accident will determine whether:
1. Further action will be necessary or not;
f
2. More information will be sought from the owner, 
employer or other person / body;
3. A limited investigation by an inspector v/ill be 
car ried out;
4. An inspector's inquiry will be called under the 
Merchant shipping ( Accident Investigation ) 
regulations 1989.
4.1.3 INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE.
Follov/ing receipt of accident information, the duty 
inspector who is required to be sent to the scene of the 
accident is conducted immediately. The Chief Inspector 
would then make a decision depending on the evidence 
obtained by the inspector (s) on whether the accident is 
going to be subjected to a limited investigation or 
whether a full inspector's inquiry is to be carried out ( 
informal / preliminary inquiry >.
When an accident leads to an inspector's inquiry.
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subsequent fact finding investigations would be conducted 
usually following the procedure required for preliminary 
inquiry as generally stipulated earlier in Chap. 3 and a 
publication of the inspectors fact findings will be the 
ultimate goal. Accidents resulting only in limited 
investigations may require only a questionnaire being sent 
for further details to the owner and or other relevant 
persons for more information and then it is closed. Such 
limited casualty investigations are published only at 
regular intervals in a form of accident summaries. It 
should be noted here that the above publications are being 
carried by the MAIB subject to the new Regulations 
requirements and it is a new undertaking.
4.3.4 FORMAL INVESTIGATIONS.
MAIB's formation did not affect the old arrangements 
for holding formal investigations into the most serious 
accidents, usually ordered by the Secretary of State after 
considering the viev/s of the inspector who carried out the 
informal / preliminary inquiry and other advice of 
casualty officers.
Several questions are also likely to be considered when 
deciding to hold a formal investigation, that is :
1. Is it likely to throw additional light on to the cause 
of the accident ?
2. Will it assist in publicizing and pursuing the lessons 
of the accident so as to prevent a recurrence ?
3. Did it involve heavy loss of life or attract expensive
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public attention ?
An informal investigation is held before a Court 
consisting of a Wreck Commissioner, who is usually a 
senior practicing Lawyer. He is assisted by assessors of 
Nautical Engineering or Naval architects. The Court is 
nominated by the Lord Chancellor and is made independent 
of the Department of Transport. The Secretary of State 
would appear before the court as one of the parties to the 
investigation and is usually represented by a lawyer ( a 
barrister specialising in Maritime cases ). The Secretary 
could also be assisted by government solicitors, while 
other parties involved, such as ship owners and masters 
etc may brief Counsels, are represented also by solicitors 
or appear on their ov/n. Before these proceedings, 
witnesses are given formal notice of the time and place of 
the hearings.
Formal investigations are held in public unless 
otherwise decided by the Commissioner, although they are 
rarely resulted to ( on average, about one a year ).
A formal investigation starts with a statement by the 
Secretary of State and other brief speeches on behalf of 
the other parties. Witnesses are then called and examined 
as necessary.
Amongst its powers is the pov/er to cancel or suspend an 
officer's certificate giving its decision and a brief 
summary of its findings, in public. However, few cases 
result in this extreme step being taken by the 
Commissioner. The Department of Transport, on the other 
hand, has no pov/ers over such certificates nor an 
officer's career, and therefore it relies on the ship 
owners for necessary disciplinary action in such cases.
The Commissioner would also make a report ( including
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his and the assessors findings on the cause (s) of the 
accident and safety improvement recommendations to avoid 
future accidents ) to the Secretary of State from where it 
is finally published. This report is signed by the 
Commissioner and the assessors and in the case of 
objections by any or all of the assessors, reasons for 
doing so would be made in writing.
A formal investigation's re - hearing is usually 
subjected to the same rules applied during formal 
investigations, but appeals can be heard by the High Court 
or Court of Session.
Following the establishment of the nev/ independent body 
( MAIB ) responsible for investigations into accidents at 
sea, on board ships and dangerous occurrences at sea. The 
procedure of investigations is expected to change more 
with time from the old system ( particularly that 
applicable to formal investigations), by making it more 
independent and less reliant on legally qualified 






Since one of the government,s major responsibilities is 
the public's protection and safety, maintenance of safe 
operations and manning of vessels registered in Kenya 
should indeed be of utmost interest. Similarly, the 
government should also maintain an equally important 
interest in the safe operation of vessels of other 
registries operating within its internal and territorial 
wa t e r s.
It is, therefore, a national obligation to examine 
marine casualties, to analyse them and thereafter to give 
publicity to such casualties in an attempt to prevent a 
recurrence of similar events. Because the primary task of 
an investigating authority ( a responsibility v/hich has 
been delegated to the MSS in Kenya ) is to promote safety, 
the most effective way of achieving this aim is by means 
of the safety recommendations made. The wide spread 
dissemination of lessons learned is the most valuable 
result of an investigation, v;hile suppression of the 
information negates the primary intent of the process and 
should be discouraged and done away with.
The public further needs to be convinced about having 
confidence in national legislation governing maritime 
safety, through the practical application of laws 
governing the conduct of those responsible for vessel 
operations and those on the management and organization of 
ship safety procedures.
77
This legislation further needs to be well known and 
clear to the public. Efforts should also be made to ensure 
that costs and or lack of ability to make regulations 
applicable do not lead to negligence of safety of life and 
property at sea.
It must be remembered that the inquiry of a marine 
casualty is in the public's interest and may have 
implications for :
- Confidence in and reliability of sea transport;
The reliability of shipowner's management and on 
those on board the ship,
thereby implying that any doubts set against the 
quality of management, v/ill also extend to the Maritime 
Safety Administration as well.
Next of kin in particular have a right to knov/ the real 
cause of a casualty and the cause of events leading to it. 
The public at large also has a right to know that an 
accident has been comprehensively and independently 
investigated for the purpose of attaching responsibility 
and compensation, in addition to possible improvements in 
maritime safety.
These obligations have been recognized and strengthened 
by IMO through previously mentioned conventions and 
resolutions ( Annex 4).
5.1.1 LEGISLATION < National ).
The source of legal authority for inquiries /
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investigations and the legal means for meeting the 
relevant international obligations has to be the National 
Legislation.
It is therefore the responsibility of a government to 
enact legislation to :
1. Define what is a casualty;
2. Provide for the circumstances in which the 
administration may conduct inquiries / 
investigations; and
3. Prescribe the nature and extent of authority vested 
in all those charged with responsibility in such 
matters.
5.1.2 CASUALTY ( Definition ).
It is very essential for the relevant terminology to be 
clarified and defined in the Merchant Shipping Act, taking 
into account words used such as "accident" and "casualty", 
for instance, under section 213 and 266 respectively. The 
reason being to avoid the difficulties sometimes 
encountered when studying the Kenya Merchant Shipping Act 
1967, in reconciling terms used to describe an accident to 
a ship, an accident aboard ship, an incident concerning 
ships, hazardous materials incidents ,or dangerous 
occurrences.
Also when dealing v/ith the words "inquiries" and 
"investigations", particularly for the public's 
understanding, the Act should similarly be reviewed and 
made clear .
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As a result, therefore, a clear definition of those 
casualties, incidents and safety hazards which must be 
reported should be provided through regulations by the 
investigating authority.
5.1.3 JURISDICTION OF THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITY.
The investigating authority should have exclusive 
jurisdiction to investigate all marine occurrences 
involving Kenyan registered or licensed ships whenever 
they occur, for the purpose of making findings as to their 
contributing factors, causes and recommendations based 
thereon.
The Merchant Shipping Act 1967, under section 264 and 
266 provides for a limited jurisdiction in that
-"v/here on, or near the coast of Kenya, a ship is 
stranded, lost------ ,
- where in any place a Kenyan ship is stranded,
lost,-------- or damaged and a witness is found in
Kenya,
- Where -------  and any evidence is obtainable in
Kenya as to the circumstances in v^hich she 
proceeded to sea or was last heard of".
It seems unacceptable that Kenya should conduct 
investigations into a marine casualty anywhere merely 
because a witness happens to be in Kenya or evidence is 
obtainable in the country.
Sometimes casualties are tragedies resulting in loss of 
life or a ship with all hands on board, leaving no first 
hand evidence to assist the investigator. However, a 
properly trained and experienced surveyor must try to fall
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back on his experience and try to put himself in the mind 
of the ship's master and others on board, so as to make 
the best possible assessment of what happened. Then most 
likely the pieces will fall into place. Witnesses should 
include people ashore as well as shipowners, and
stevedores if a cargo shift is considered a possible v
factor in the accident. Witnesses should also include 
officers involved in search and rescue, the pilot who was 
last on board, local residents who may have seen what 
happened if a casualty occurred near shore. All possible 
alternatives should be exploited for information to be 
made available.
Further more, the investigating authority should have 
jurisdiction consistent with international law, including 
the Law of tlie Sea Convention 1982, to investigate all 
marine occurrences involving foreign ships when they occur 
within 200 miles of Kenya's shores or up to the outer edge 
of the continental margin which ever is furthest, or when 
such occurrences involve a foreign ship when on a voyage 
to or from a Kenyan port.
5.1.4 REPORTING.
Reporting of marine casualties needs to be done 
directly to the investigating authority through a 
comprehensive casualty reporting system which should also 
provide for voluntary reporting of marine accidents. This 
is in addition to the current procedure requiring 
mandatory reporting by ov/ner or master to the Minister of 
Transport and communications, by letter signed, by those 
reporting. The investigating authority should also define, 
through regulations, those casualties, incidents and
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safety hazards which must be reported 
comprehensive reporting system should 





Reporting of marine casualties needs to be done through 
a casualty reporting form in place of the current practice 
of reporting by letter. An appropriate form should 
therefore be developed and provided and hence distributed 
to all registered ships, shipowners, ship dockyards, 
surveyors, maritime institutions. This is to enable the 
recipients to familiarize themselves v/ith the reporting 
requirements. Such a form will also be intended to provide 
the investigating officer with the basic information about 
the ship, her ov/ner, master, officers and crew, cargo, the 
type of casualty and the surrounding circumstances, 
thereby reducing the burden of writing a letter to report 
a casualty by owner or master.
( Annex 6 provides a typical format of a marine 
casualty reporting form ).
Last but not least this paper is further recommending 
that :
/
1. Kenya should ratify those IMO, conventions which 
directly affect maritime safety .
2. The Kenya Merchant Shipping Act, 1967 should be 
revised to incorporate the requirements / obligations 
of a signatory government, to the international 
conventions to enable the country to meet the
international
treaty obligations and contribute effectively to the 
safety of life and property at sea, and to protection 
of the marine environment.
82
3. A new set of rules and regulations to implement and 
enforce the requirements of IMO conventions should be 
drafted.
5.2 THE PURPOSE.
The primary purpose of marine casualty investigations 
should continue to be the improvement of safety of lives 
and property in the marine mode of transport. Casualty 
investigations need to be seen as a form of preventive 
medicine i.e the process of finding out the causes of the 
casualties, learning lessons and recommending on or 
sometimes improving regulations and safety measures to 
prevent recurrences should be of the utmost interest.
Investigations are acknowledged as having resulted in 
major improvements in areas such as ship construction, 
life saving and fire fighting equipment, navigational 
aids, levels of competency of sea men, search and rescue, 
and prevention of marine pollution. They should continue 
to improve further, marine safety.
5.2.1 DISCIPLINARY / CIVIL LIABILITY.
The disciplinary and civil liability aspects of 
casualty investigations have been considered in many 
countries as additional purposes, or at least consequences 
of the process. Even if ( for instance on disciplinary 
aspect) it only requires including recommendations in the 
investigation reports to the effect that disciplinary 
action should be taken by others e.g the U.S.C.G who 
engages a separate proceeding before an Administrative Law
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Judge for this purpose.
Kenya, applies a similar system, since disciplinary 
recommendations in a report may be used to remove 
incompetent seamen to avoid further safety risks. As 
provided in the Act, the Minister has jurisdiction to 
appoint a judge/ commissioner to hold a formal 
investigation and may cancel or suspend a certificate or 
licence of a master, mate or engineer granted under the 
Act when there is proof of wrongful act or default, 
incompetence or gross act of misconduct.
This process is obviously likely to have negative 
consequences for the willingness of the personnel involved 
to cooperate in the investigation in explaining what 
really happened. Naturally, the reaction would be to 
remain silent, or mostly give false or misleading 
information and to be cautious in giving statements, or to 
require a lav/yer before giving an answer. This would limit 
the investigator from getting a complete picture of the 
circumstances underlying causes of an accident.
Since the duty of a safety administrative officer 
involves taking legal steps on offenses against safety 
regulations, he should be ruled out as an investigator.
The investigator shoul^d only have a safety promoting aim.
Solution.
A marine casualty investigation system :
1. Should be totally independent of any disciplinary 
process, v/hich should be completely separate,
2. Should not determine or apportion blame or recommend 
any type of disciplinary action,
3. Should, however, not be prohibited from engaging in 
fact finding, where it may be concluded that a person
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committed a fault which could be subject to 
disciplinary action.
Similarly,
4. It should not determine or apportion liability.
5. Its reports should not be prohibited from making 
objective fact finding from which fault giving rise 
to possible civil liability may be determined or 
coneluded.
5.3 MARINE CASUALTIES TO BE INVESTIGATED 
AND EXTENT OF INVESTIGATION.
Since it could be costly to investigate fully all 
reported marine occurrences, some of which may have no 
lessons to be derived and learned, it would be appropriate 
if more elaborate criteria v/ere set out for casualties 
that require to be investigated, either through a 
preliminary investigation, and or formal investigation.
All marine incident reports should, however, be 
examined and causal determinations made. Where conclusions 
can easily be reached,' no further investigations need to 
be carried out. However, appropriate recordings should be 
effected in order to help determine safety deficiencies.
When a casualty report is incomplete or not 
sufficiently informative to make causal determination, 
further verification should be carried out.
When causal determination cannot be reached through 
examination and verification of a casualty, the 
investigating authority should carry out further
85
investigations until such a determination can be made - 
( Annex 5 provides a developed and recommended 
investigation system)
When it appears that something complex or unusual 
occurred or when it is apparent that important safety 
lessons can be learned, the investigating authority should 
investigate to the fullest extent possible, until the 
facts are clearly established to its satisfaction.
It is for this reason that criteria or guidelines set 
would be useful in determining when one of the above 
courses of action should be followed. For instance, a 
casualty resulting in considerable loss of life or 
extensive property damage could have simple facts readily 
known and easily determined causes, requiring no detailed 
investigation v/hatsoever, unless on the other hand, it 
arouses considerable public concern and sensitivity.
These guidelines should be reviev/ed periodically by the 
investigating authority which should also have full 
discretion regarding their application.
However, different levels of investigations should not 
be taken to mean different methods of investigations, 
since they will only range from a simple verification of a 
casualty reporj,, to a full field investigation, and or by 
a public hearing depending on the degree of severity and 
or damage / complexity or recommendations made by 
investigating officers. All should have the same objective 
of determining the cause (s).
The bottom line is the determination of the 
contributing factors and causes of a marine occurrence.
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identification of safety deficiencies and recommendation 
of corrective courses of action to be taken by the safety 
promoting authority, to improve safety of life and 
property at sea.
5.3.1 PUBLIC INQUIRIES AS PART OF THE INVESTIGATION.
Investigation guidelines / regulations should further 
state the powers to hold public inquiries as part of the 
investigations, while the investigating authority must use 
its discretion to decide when to hold a public inquiry. In 
addition, the authority needs to establish, review 
periodically and publish the general criteria it would 
consider when choosing to conduct a public inquiry. The 
chairman of such an authority should have the authority to 
order that a public inquiry be held.
Finally, the investigating authority should have the 
power, V7ith the approval of the Chairman, to make 
regulations establishing rules of procedure and rules of 
evidence for public inquiries. These also need to provide 
for the purpose of the inquiry i.e to remain a fact 
finding proceeding as io the contributing factors and 
causes of the casualty being investigated.
( The provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act relating to 
formal public investigations should be repealed)
5.3.2 ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION OF CAUSES.
Analysis involves selection of relevant facts, thorough 
examination of these facts and comparison of the results 
with existing regulations, standards and established
87
practices covering marine casualty investigations, 
nationally and internationally.
Ana,lysis should take into consideration the following 
aspects if it is expected to produce positive results.
1. Human aspects, such as willingness and ability to 
communicate, skills, fatigue, knowledge, experience
2. The quality and or quantity of evidence taken.
3. Technical aspects involved in the casualty e.g 
failure of equipment, poor workmanship, cargo 
stowage.
4. Determination of the most probable cause / causes of 
the casualty involved.
A fundamental condition of the effectiveness of maritime 
safety work is that it is performed by competent persons.
Investigating officers, therefore need, as a result, to 
acquire or be knowledgeable on interview techniques, legal 
rights of witnesses, administration of oaths, photography, 
all relevant safety standards as advocated by national and 
international requirements, and classification societies.
They should have knowledge and or ability to interpret 
information gathered during investigations.
They further require continuous on the job training 
through seminars, symposia inter alia to update their 
expertise in investigation techniques. This is because the 
qualifications of an investigator assigned to a casualty 
investigation determine the thoroughness and quality of
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results obtained.
5.4 POWERS OF THE INVESTIGATOR.
The investigating officer should have powers provided 
for by the provisions of the Act relating to this aspect 
and must include :
- Power to enter any premises or board any vessel and 
examine her and the equipment / machinery, to secure 
attendance of and interview witnesses, take statements, 
collect, examine, and or make copies of papers, books, 
records, and documents, take photographs, remove or mark 
any original documents or objects for future 
identification. All these v/ould be of great assistance in 
development of facts and determination and establishment 
of the cause (s) of a casualty.
- Pov/er to protect the site of a casualty.
- Pov^er to require medical information or examination as 
well as autopsies.
The investigating officer must be required to be at the 
scene of casualty early enough to collect evidence and 
interviev? witnesses while investigation material is fresh, 
and before time has changed or v/iped out important 
evidence.
When a casualty occurs and there are indications of 
investigators being blocked from entering the vessel, the 
investigator should have pov/ers provided to :
- Impound the vessel.
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- Cease the licences of officers and crew, and provide 
minimal penalty fines for failure to cooperate.
When a casualty involves a foreign vessel or is in 
foreign waters, the Minister must ensure there is 
assistance of the foreign government through diplomatic 
circles, and other officials and departments such as 
customs inter alia. The classification society covering 
the vessel must be asked to cooperate and provide expert 
witnesses.
5.5 WITNESS INTERVIEWS.
The investigating officer must ensure that interviews 
of witnesses are productive in all aspects. It is his duty 
to make sure that witnesses are officially invited by 
either letter, telephone, or verbally to attend interviews 
and be examined. Investigating officers should have the 
right to use their discretion on whether to interview them 
on oath or to conduct informal interviews.
When a witness requests the right to be assisted by his 
own lawyer, he should be allowed and his lawyer also to 
ask ask questions pertinent to the safety purpose of the 
investigation, provided he does not make statements.
Witnesses interviews should be conducted in privacy "in 
camera". However, when the investigator deems it necessary 
to interview more than one witness at a time, for instance 
the master and the watch officer, he may do so provided 
there is consent of the witnesses .
Witnesses statements must be read to them before they 
are signed, unless they prepared their own statements < in
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which case they will have full knowledge of the contents 
). Further more, witnesses should be informed when their 
testimony is to be recorded, although this should not 
require his consent and copies of statements should be 
made available upon request by witnesses. When recorded 
tapes are to be used, they should not be erased until they 
cannot serve any further purpose.
In short, it is recommended that :
1. Witnesses' statements obtained by investigating 
officers whether in oral form or written, should 
together with the identity of the witness himself be 
privileged and should not be used against a witness 
in any legal or other proceedings anywhere < without 
this a witness may be reluctant to give correct 
evidence). This privilege should be exempted only 
when :
Ca) The investigating authority is using it and even so, 
it should only be used in civil proceedings or a 
prosecution for perjury, or for giving contradictory 
evidence, or for knowingly giving false or misleading 
evidence;
(b) When an officer authorised by law to gain access to 
it requires so;
<c) It is released to a court after the court's
examination concludes that it is necessary for the 
administration of justice.
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5.6 THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITY.
The investigating body ought to be quite independent of 
both Maritime Administration and business interests. As 
such it will neither have powers to put its own 
recommended measures into effect, nor need to have this 
power at all.
It is very important for any authority engaged in the 
investigation of marine casualties to be independent and 
totally separate from the maritime safety administration . 
This is because it is the maritime safety administration 
that issues maritime regulations or takes an active role 
in their issue; examines and has the responsibility of 
checking vessel's seaworthiness; issues certificates; 
confirms the seaworthiness of ships in various respects; 
is responsible for the manning of ships and the competence 
and the licensing of the personnel. It also provides 
marine services e.g aids to navigation and where any of 
these is found to be faulty, the investigator may hesitate 
to criticize his colleagues.
Under such circumstances, an accident can be a proven 
sign that the safety authority has failed in its efforts 
to prevent casualties. It is inappropriate that the 
Maritime Safety Administration should investigate 
accidents which they have had the opportunity to prevent 
earlier. Involved parties could therefore conclude that 
the safety administration contributed to the accident 
through careless inspections or deficiency in regulations 
and safety devices. Difficulties also arise when it is 
further seen to be investigating itself.
As a result, therefore, marine casualties ought to be 
investigated by an impartial board which is totally 
separate from the Safety Administration.
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This paper, therefore, strongly reconunends that ;
A Marine Tribunal be established in Kenya for the 
purpose of conducting independent investigations into 
marine casualties, in place of the existing arrangement, 
where the merchant shipping superintendent's office has 
been entrusted with the powers to carry out this 
responsibility, through delegation of duties by the 
Minister of Transport and Communications.
The Marine Tribunal should be composed of the following
members
1. A Judicial and an experienced Judge,
2. A Nautical Master Mariner, and
3. A Marine Engineer.
The most suitable of these three members should be 
designated Chairman of the Tribunal for the executive 
administration of the Tribunal.
The three members should be assisted by assessors to be 
drawn from the Maritime Safety Office, but who will no 
longer belong to this office, since they will be 
maintained in the safety administration within a panel 
mainly for this purpose, and from which the Tribunal will 
be selecting especially the “most suitable for assistance 
in formal investigations.
The responsibilities of this board should include inter 
alia :
- Looking into all aspects of marine casualty
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investigations in Kenya.
- Production of a Safety Manual for use by the Maritime 
Safety Office, the Ministry and investigators, 
shipowners, crew, educational institutions, mariners 
as may be deemed necessary by this office.
- Should try to simplify the Act and its provisions and 
incorporate such factors as casualty reporting 
guidelines and criteria, casualty report form 
provisions, types of casualty investigations in 
gathering facts and evidence, as well as casualty 
reports.
- Keep records of casualty statistics, conduct analysis 
of accumulated casualty data in Kenya using 
computer technology programs and maintain cooperation 
internationally with other investigations Board and 
other organizations.
- Look into crew matters and particularly those not 
involved with disciplinary action.
- Look into L. Victoria serious casualties which have 
remained under the Kenya Railways Corporation.
The Tribunal should have the objective of facilitating 
casualty investigation proceedings and elimination of the 
conflict of interests as earlier mentioned. It should also 
shorten investigation time and reduce costs, since there 
will be no time wasted in deciding on formal 
investigations for instance. In addition it should 
facilitate early release of casualty reports.
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- Th© Tribunal should, within its powers, point out any 
shortcomings found in th© maritime regulations.
- It should conduct fair and impartial investigations 
into marine casualties, and produce and prepare annual 
reports to parliament and conduct safety studies for 
the improvement of marine safety.
- Last but not least, the Tribunal should be directly 
responsible to th© central government.
5.7 REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATING AUTHORITY.
All marine casualty investigation reports should be 
made available to th© public immediately, subject only to 
any restrictions that may be required in the interests of 
national security.
Casualty reports should be published in all cases where 
the investigating Marine Tribunal conducts a casualty 
investigation.
fMarine reports should include :
A brief introduction, a summary, findings of facts, 
conclusions and comments, and finally recommendations, as 
previously discussed.
Prior to issuance of an investigation report, it is 
recommended that, a confidential copy of its draft should 
be submitted to the Minister of Transport and 
Communications, and to any one else who, in the opinion of 
the investigating tribunal, has a direct interest in its
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findings and recommendations. Any person to whom such a 
draft is given should be given reasonable time to make 
presentations in such a manner as the tribunal deems 
appropriate and which, in turn, the tribunal should 
consider.
Even after publication of a casualty investigation 
report by the Tribunal, it should have a right to 
reconsider its findings and recommendations whenever, it 
is deemed necessary.
The Tribunal should further have powers to conduct 
safety analysis arising out of a casualty report and 
subsequently report on the results.
Finally, when disseminating casualty report findings 
and recommendations, the Tribunal should aim at getting 
the pertinent information into the hands of mariners, 
including fishing vessel mariners, shipowners, ship 
repairers and marine institutes.
5.6 SAFETY DEFICIENCIES^ AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
A casualty investigation's main purpose is the 
identification of safety deficiencies and submission of 
recommendations which may be directed to marine regulatory 
authorities, to government, to the marine community, to 
ship repairers, to shipowners, and to mariners, in order 
to avoid reoccurrences.
The Marine tribunal should therefore have the 
responsibility to develop and issue safety recommendations 
whenever appropriate, whether as a result of an
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investigation or as a result of statistical or other 
analysis.
In pursuit of the above, it should use its discretion 
on whether to consult experts both within and outside the 
government provided that no conflict of interest is 
created and that, such consultations are contributory 
factors to the final report.
These recommendations either, general or specific, 
should be included in the casualty investigations reports.
j
The investigation Tribunal should stipulate in its 
report the time limit within which any government 
department, or agency, to which a recommendation is made, 
is required to take action intended in the report, or its 
rejection to such a recommendation. In case of a 
rejection, good reasons for doing so should be made clear 
in writing and all these need to also be made available to 
the public.
Last but not least, it is very important for the 




Although Kenya is not a prominent maritime nation 
( annex 2 ) as shown by the total number of vessels plying 
within its waters annually, numerous marine accidents 
involving particularly small commercial boats and canoes 
in addition to those of registered vessels, occur each 
year along the coastal waters and in Lake Victoria. 
Nevertheless, very 1ittle•public attention has been drawn 
to these incidents. As a matter of fact, it is only when 
there has been considerable heavy loss of life that the 
casualty becomes sensational and attracts considerable 
public attention. This, however, contradicts the real 
situation in the marine industry where a substantial 
number of Kenyans make a living out of or through the use 
of seas and lake. This is particularly the case in the 
fishing industry, sea transport, canoe and ferry services, 
small scale pleasure boating by tourists and merchant 
shipping. This reflects substantial economic activity, 
which represents also a considerable proportion of the 
country's gross national product.
As a result, therefore, safety deficiencies in the 
marine industry have an adverse effect on the national 
economy because shipping is known to be a capital 
intensive business and human life is obviously as highly 
sacred and valuable.
Those major national decisions taken to increase the 
safety of life and property at sea should thus give top 
priority to making the marine casualty investigation 
process public. This is due. to the fact that many lives 
and ships have been lost simply because the lessons learnt 
from accident investigations do not reach those who are 
most concerned i.e, the mariners. As a result they miss 
the opportunity to learn from the experience of others.
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This will be achieved by the implementation of 
recommendations made earlier regarding the establishment 
of an independent marine investigation tribunal, with 
jurisdiction over all serious marine casualties both at 
sea and on Lake Victoria. It is the only objective that 
will aim at solving the conflict of interests problem 
prevailing in the present system.
Similarly, implementation of the recommended department 
of shipping in the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, for the improvement of maritime safety 
issues in the country, is going to be a great achievement.
Further more, this paper acknowledges that it would be 
very difficult to achieve the above without legislation. 
This paper therefore, urges immediate review and updating 
of the Merchant Shipping Act 1967. Further international 
conventions related to safety promotion in the marine mode 
of transport need to be considered, ratified and 
incorporated into the Act.
In conclusion, this paper wishes to remind those 
involved in marine safety promotion that, since casualties 
will continue to happen, as there is no such thing known 
as perfect safety, v/e should learn from them in order to 
avoid other unnecessary losses. "Unless conclusions are 
promulgated without fear or favour and corrective measures 
are taken, then an opportunity has been lost and valuable 
lives and ships have been sacrificed in vain", as stated 
in a London seminar at the Institute of Marine Engineers.
Lessons learned from casualty investigations,, 
irrespective of whether they are considered to be 
insignificant, rare, or acts of God, provide a rationale 
for continuous improvement in the development of effective 
investigations for furtherance of marine safety.
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ANNEX. 1.




NAME GRT PORT OF REGISTRY WHEN BUILT
AND YEAR
Imbran 77.95 MSA 1968 1952
Samaki 46.22 MSA 1968 1957
Maymun 69.01 MSA 1968 1956
Mvi ta 47.79 MSA 1968 1957
Nabila 1168.01 MSA 1969 1962
Baruti 32.42 MSA 1969 -
Khole Khole 49.92 MSA 1969 1969
Shakwe 122.15 MSA 1970 1969
Suli Suli 15.38 MSA 1971 -
Impala 110.62 MSA 1971 -
Tev;a 217.48 MSA 1977 1928
Safina 381.68 MSA 1976 1975
Karibuni 17.26 MSA 1977 1975
Kuvuna 225.22 MSA 1977 1966
Kuvuna 62.43 MSA 1977 1970
Kus i 352.72 MSA 1978 1977
St . Christ
Likoni 104.69 MSA 1978 1957
St. Michael 104.50 MSA 1978 1959
Mvi ta 193.30 MSA 1978 1969
Tobia 27.79 MSA 1979 1977
U juzi 118.72 MSA 1979 1968
Kuvuna 62.43 MSA 1979 1972
Funguo 275.89 MSA 1980 1980
Uchumi 275.89 MSA 1980 1980
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Mki zi 45.12 MSA 1980 1980
Lariana 55.53 MSA 1991 1978
Tawakal 271.12 MSA 1982 1982
Kiboko 391.67 MSA 1982 1976
El Lamy 354.58 MSA 1982 1982
Mchunguzi 38.06 MSA 1982 1982
Mlizi 38.06 MSA 1982 1982
Kiongozi - MSA 1982 1982,
Taisir 260.97 MSA 1983 1983
Simba II 361.63 MSA 1984 1983
Nguvu 11 361.63 MSA 1984 1984
Morea 194.95 MSA 1984 1965
Chui 361.63 MSA 1984 1984
Mwokozi 672.85 MSA 1984 1984
Nyuni 658.82 MSA 1984 1966
Duma 361.63 MSA 1984 1984
Tawakal 886.29 MSA 1984 1984
Faru 361.63 MSA 1985 1984
Shaza 15.04 MSA 1985 1964
Nasseeb 50.80 MSA 1985 1964







Overdraft II 13.83 MSA 1985 1978
Harrier 28.56 MSA 1985 1977
A1 Nasser 144.21 MSA 1985 1984
Fadhili A1 76.29 MSA 1985 1963
Karim
Sof i-a 988.23 MSA 1985 1970
Source - Merchant Shipping Office ( 1990 )*.
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ANNEX3
THE KENYA MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT -CAP. 389.
"213 Accidents to Kenya ships to be reported.
Where a Kenya ship has sustained or caused an accident 
occasioning loss of life or serious injury to any person 
or has received any material damage affecting her 
seaworthiness or her efficiency either in her hull or in 
any part of her machinery, the ovmer or master shall, as 
soon as possible after the happening of the accident or 
damage transmit to the Minister, by letter signed by the 
owner or master, a report of the accident or damage and 
its probable occasion, stating the name of the ship, her 
official number if any, the port to which she belongs and 
the place where she is.
SHIPPING CASUALTIES.
"264 A Shipping casualty shall be taken to occur:
(a) Where, on or near the coast of Kenya, a ship is
tranded, lost, abandoned or damaged, or any loss of 
life occurs by reason of a casualty happening to or 
on board a ship.
<b> Where in any place a Kenya ship is stranded, lost 
, abandoned or damaged and a v/itness is found in 
Kenya .
(c) Where a Kenya ship is lost or supposed to have been 
lost and any evidence is obtainable in Kenya as to 
the circumstances in which she proceeded to sea or 
was last heard of.
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"265 Preliminary inquiry.
1. Where a shipping casualty has occurred, a preliminary 
inquiry may be held respecting the casualty by a 
receiver, a surveyor or any other person appointed for 
the purpose by the Minister.
2. For the purpose of an inquiry, the person holding the 
inquiry shall have the powers of a surveyor under this 
Act, and in addition may require the attendance of all 
such persons as he thinks fit to call before him, and 
may require answers or returns to any inquiries he 
thinks fit to make, and may administer oaths.
3. Upon the conclusion of an inquiry, the person who made 
it shall send to the Minister a report containing a 
full statement of the case and his opinion there on , 
accompanied by such report of or extracts from the 
evidence and such observations as he thinks fit.
" 266 Formal investigations by commissioner.
1. The Minister may appoint a Judge, a Magistrate or a 
senior public officer^to be a commissioner to hold formal 
investigations or a formal investigation under this part.
2. A formal investigation need not be preceded by a 
preliminary inquiry.
3. A formal investigation may be held in the following 
cases:
(a) Shipping casualty;
(b) Where a master, mate, pilot or engineer is charged 
with incompetence, misconduct or default while serving
<i) On board a Kenya ship, or
<ii) On board any other ship on or near the coast of 
Kenya or in the course of a voyage to a port in
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Kenya
4. The commissioner so appointed shall hold a formal 
investigation with the assistance of one or more assessors 
of nautical, engineering or other special skills or 
knowledge appointed by the Minister from a list approved 
by the Minister for the purpose.
" 267 Powers of commissioner.
The commissioner shall have all the powers and 
privileges of a commissioner appointed under the 
commissions of inquiry Act.
268 Power of commissioner as to certificates.
1. The certificate or licence of a master, mate or 
engineer granted under this Act may be cancelled or 
suspended by a commissioner holding a formal investigation 
into a shipping casualty under this part, if the 
commissioner finds that the loss or abandonment of or 
serious damage to a ship or loss of life has been caused 
by:
(a> His wrongful act or default.
(b) His incompetenc-e or gross act of misconduct.
(c) In a case of collision, his failure to render such 
assistance or give such information as is required 
under part v.
2. A cancellation or suspension under this section 
requires the concurrence of the majority of the assessors 
assisting the commissioner.
3. Each assessor who does not concur in and sign the 
report of the commissioner shall state in writing his 
dissent and the reasons for it.
4. The commissioner shall in all cases send a full report 
on the case with the evidence to the Minister and shall
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also, if he desires to cancel or suspend any certificate 
or licence, send the certificate or licence so cancelled 
or suspended to the Minister with his report, and a copy 
of the report shall also be furnished to the master, mate 
or engineer whose certificate or licence has been 
cancelled.
" 269 Delivery up of certificates.
1. The commissioner may at one time during or after a 
formal investigation call upon any master, mate or 
engineer to deliver his certificate or licence to him, and 
the commissioner on receiving the certificate or licence 
shall send it to the Minister.
2. On receiving the certificate, the Minister shall, if
the certificate or licence:
<a) Has been granted in Kenya, retain it, or 
(b) Has been granted else where than in Kenya, send it 
together with the full report upon the case and a 
copy of the evidence, to the Government of the 
country concerned.
270 Rehearing of,, formal investigations.
1. Where a formal investigation has been held, the 
Minister may order the investigation to be re held either 
generally or as to any part thereof, and shall so order
if;
(a) A new and importance evidence that could not be
produced at the investigation has been discovered, 
or
<b) For any other reason there has been in his opinion 
ground for suspecting that a miscarriage of justice 
has occurred.
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2. The Minister may order the investigation to be held by 
the commissioner who held the investigation in the first 
instance, or may appoint another commissioner and select 
the same or other assessors to hear the case.
3. Whereon an investigation decision has been given with 
respect to the cancelling or suspension of the certificate 
or licence of a master, mate or engineer and an 
application for the investigation to be held under this 
section has not been made or has been refused, an appeal 
shall lie from the decision of the court.
271 " Inquiries as to the fitness of officers.
1. Where the Minister has reason to believe that a master, 
mate or engineer is from incompetence or misconduct unfit 
to discharge his duties, or that in a case of collision he 
has failed to render such assistance or give such 
information as is required by this Act, he may cause an 
inquiry to be held.
2. The Minister may ei^ther himself appoint a person to 
hold the inquiry or may direct the inquiry to be held 
before a judge.
3. Where the inquiry is held by a person appointed by the 
Minister, that person
(a) Shall hold the inquiry v/ith the assistance of a 
competent lawyer appointed by the minister;
<b) Shall have all the powers of a surveyor under this 
Act.
(c) Shall give a master, mate or engineer against whom 
a charge is made an opportunity of making his
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defense, either in person or otherwise, and may 
summon him to appear;
<d) May make such order with regard to the costs of the 
inquiry as he thinks fit; and
(e) Shall send a report upon the case to the Minister.
4. Where the inquiry is held by a judge, the inquiry shall 
be conducted and the results reported in the same manner, 
and the court shall have the same power, as in the case of 
a formal investigation into a shipping casualty under this 
part.
5. Where upon an inquiry the Minister is satisfied -
(a) That the master, mate or engineer has been shown to 
be incompetent or has been guilty of an act of 
misconduct, drunkenness or tyranny;
(b) That the loss or abandonment of or serious damage to 
a ship or any loss of life was caused by the 
wrongful act or default of the master, mate or 
engineer;
(c) That the master, mate or engineer has been guilty of 
a criminal offence or has been blamed by a Coroner's 
inquest in respect to the death of any person; or
(d) That the master or mate, in a case of collision 
betv/een his vessel and another vessel, has failed 
without reasonable cause to comply v^ith the 
requirements of this Act with regard to rendering 
assistance or to giving information .
He may suspend or cancel the certificate of competency or 
licence of the master or mate or the certificate or 
licence of the engineer, as the case may be.
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Annex 4
INTERNATIONAL <IMO) GUIDELINES ON CASUALTY 
INVESTIGATIONS.
IMO has also adopted a number of guidelines on casualty- 
investigations inter alia the following:-
1. IMO Resolution A.442 urges governments to ensure they 
have available efficient means and suitably qualified 
personnel and material resources to enable them 
adequately to enforce international regulations 
particularly in cases of casualties and contraventions 
of maritime safety or marine environmental protection.
1. IMO Resolution A.173 is intended to ensure that states 
seriously affected by or having a substantial interest 
in a maritime casualty have the opportunity of being 
represented at inquiries into or proceedings related to 
such casualty.
- It seeks unification of practice in relation to such 
inquiries and proceedings.
- Recommends that a flag state holding an inquiry into a 
casualty v^hich affects or may affect another state to 
consult -v/ith that state or if the inquiry is held as a 
matter of course then to inform that state of its date 
and place.
- Recommends that unless otherwise required by national 
rules, such inquiry be open to the public and permit 
a representative of the other state concerned to 
attend and participate.
- Recommends similar facilities be extended to the flag 
state at an inquiry held by a state seriously 
affected or having substantial interest in a 
casualty.
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- Does not affect or apply to the holding of a 
preliminary of informal inquiry or any other 
proceedings.
- Recommends that a state should not be treated for the 
purposes of the resolution as being affected by or 
having a substantial interest in a casualty only by 
virtue of its being the flag state of a vessel 
involved or by one of its nationals having a 
commercial interest in the ship or its cargo.
3. Resolution A.322 draws the attention of contracting 
governments to the SOLAS and LL conventions to their 
obligations to investigate casualties in accordance 
with those conventions.
Urges these governments to provide IMO with information 
on the findings of such investigation.
Requests the IMO Maritime Safety Committee to examine 
regularly such reports and recommend action as 
necessary and to list serious casualties and request 
administration to provide information regarding 
inquiries held by t»hem.
4. Resolution A.440 urges governments to cooperate on a 
mutual basis in investigations into marine casualties 
and to exchange information freely for the purpose of a 
full appraisal of such casualties.
5. Resolution 433 provides a standard marine casualty 
report form which includes a means of classifying the 
causes of casualties and
Urges Administrations to complete and forward this form 
to IMO in respect of the total or constructive total 
loss of ships of 1600 gross tonnage or more and of
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ships of 500 gross tonnage involved in loss of life.
Recommends that the information so supplied be based on 
the report of
1. A court or board of formal investigation
2. A preliminary inquiry or investigation carried out 
by the administration or
3. An informal fact - finding investigation carried out 
by the administration.
Recommends a copy of the above report or extracts 
therefrom be forwarded to IMO with the marine casualty 
report .
Urges completion and forwarding to IMO of the fire 
casualty record < MSC/ cir.388), intact stability 
casualty record ( MSC / cir. 224) and the 
questionnaire on the Marine Distress system ( COM/ 
circ.70) (Annex 2)
6. Resolution A 147 applies to all governments including 
those not parties to the MARPOL convention and 
recommends action for the reporting and processing of 
reports of oil poll<ution incidents and the provision of 
such information to IMO.
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THE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCESS
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TOTS-IAT OF CASD.'J.T^’ 'HZPORTS -V
1. Trie conplcted fora sjiould be rcturried as soon as possible to Ibe I>:0 
Secretai'iat.
2. Where it is proposed to caxxy out fur-lher investifjations, this fora r/nould 
nevertheless be conrpletc-d as far as possible and relrurned to the Secretariat
3. TJie s'crrzzx^’ and recoraendationo of any subsequent report snould be foi*..Tirdcd 
to the Secretariat in duo coua*se.







Date of Casualty Tire of 
Casualty 
local tire)
Type of Casualty 
(i.e. fire, 
foundered, etc.)
iJare(s) and ?lar;(5) 




Kane of place or sea 
where casualty occurred
Latitude and longitude 
of casualty
State of sea, weather 
and visibility at tire 
of casualty
Port last sailed 









Brief account of the sequence of events of the casualty:
]?otc- bv the Sc-crc-lari at :




Brief arcovmt of any assistar.ee given to the ship and/or rescue 
services provided:
Brief account of the extent of the daicage to 
the ship:




Broken up ^ 
Not rereved






Adoup.t, i f i'Oioun
Is a fujTther investiralion to be If yea further inforaation
carried out? Yes/Ho* should be for--^a-rded in due
course





INT^R-COYERNMENTAL maritime consultative: Pf^q^NJ2ATlON
Fip: CASUALTY RECORD
^Io.
1. Date ud plaop of casualty'** ................................................................................................................
2. Type of ship (passeager, cargo, bulk caxn’cr, oil tanker, fishing vessel, etc.) ..................
3. Were any voyage limits imposed cm the ship?*
4. Year of build .................................... Year of major reconstruction .............
5. Pardevtian of ship :
^ Length between peipendieuiars (in metres) ............................ Cross register tonnage
Propelling machinery (type, fuel, etc.) ...................................................................................................
6. Nature of cargo .........................................................................................................................................
^ .7. Location of ship; Was the ship under way or in port? ............................................. ......
If in port, specify the condition (loading, uploading, under repair, or others) .......................
8. Local conditions : Time (dayHght or darkness) .............................. . Wind forep (Beaufort scale)
State of sea (and code used ).......
9. Pan of ship where fire broke out* ........................... ..................... ......................... ......................
10. Prooable cause of fire*
11. Description of damage* ..
12. No. of persons on board : Passengets .........................................................  Crew
13. No. of victims; Dead ............ ............................................... injured .....................
14. Structural fire protectioa (briefly describe fire resisting and fire retarding bulkheads, doors, docks, etc., through 
the whole area affected by fire): ........................... ...........  ...........................
15. Fire detection method at site of fire:
(a) Automatic ........
(b) Others* .. .................
Source -IMO 114
Fixed fire exliogulstiing io$ullalk>ns:
(a) At site of tire ...................................................... ........................ .....................................................
(b) Adjacent areas......................................... .............................................................................
Ship's fire exiisguishiog equipment used (foam, dry chemical, CO>, water, ttcam, etc.): 
(a) Fixed* .................................................................................................................................................
(b) Portable*
Effeciivcness of action lalfco by crew to extinguish fire :
Outside assistance given and equipment used (e.g. fire department, pihcr ship. e(c.):
\




Rccordi 10 be cotnpieicd for piiucn|cr, ctJ/o and tishinj vc^icU of 25 m. in length and over, and thould cover caxualiid 
which occurred in 1H2 and later. ^ waauanie*
The provuion of data marked U opiionai.
Data marked with gn aitcmk (*) thould be given ag preciaely at pouibte.
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ALD ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE.
C.G. COAST GUARD.
ILO INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION.
I MO INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION.
KPA KENYA PORTS AUTHORITY.
KR KENYA RAILWAYS.
LL 66 LOAD LINE CONVENTION, 1966.
MARAD MARITIME ADMINISTRATION.
MARPOL INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF
POLLUTION FROM SHIPS. 1974/76.
M D MANAGING DIRECTOR.
MAIB MARINE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATIONS BOARD.
MOTC MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS.
MSC MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE.
MSS MERCHANT SHIPPING SUPERINTENDENT.
NTSB NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD.
OBO ORE BULK OIL.
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OCMI OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MARINE INSPECTIONS.
SOLAS INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE
AT SEA, 1974/78.
STCW STANDARD OF TRAINING, CERTIFICATION AND
WATCHKEEPING CONVENTION, 1978.
TEU TWENTY FOOT EQUIVALENT UNIT.
UK UNITED KINGDOM.
UNCTAD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT.
VLCC VERY LARGE CRUDE CARRIER.
VHF VERY HIGH FREQUENCY .
US UNITED STATES .
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